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This thesis is a historical review and an analytical study
f the role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in set
ting African conflicts. The study begins with a brief account
>f the formation of the Organization of African Unity. It pro-
eeds with an examination of the OAU Charter and the Commission
f Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. It then reviews and
alnalyzes the role of the OAU in settling nine major selected
disputes and ends with a recommendation for the creation of an
All-African High Command, which I believe would make the OAU
mpre effective.
This study is of importance because it attempts to assess
the contention of Professor George Liska and other authorities
that small or weak regional organizations are incapable of
deterring aggression and therefore cannot preserve regional
i
p^ace and security, and that consequently the influence of big
pdwers will always be present. The study revealed that while
foreign influence is evident in the OAU, a few states are
adamantly asserting their non-aligned status, and that these
countries were most diligent in trying to settle African dis
putes. The analysis also showed that though the OAU was unable
to solve major conflicts, it helped restore peace and security
in a number of instances. The overall conclusion is that the
OAU is an entity which, though powerless to cope with all the
numerous political disputes, is still regarded by a majority of
its members as the only African organization which can help
bring genuine peace and security to the continent as a whole.
The Organization is still searching for means to realise its
aims.
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The Necessity of Forming the OAU
The continuous attack on the colonial system by Pan-
Africanists-especially after the Fifth Pan-African Conference
of 1945, coupled with provision in the U.N. Charter advocating
that the inhabitants of colonies be made to "develop self-
overnment or independence," resulted, in the early 1950s, in
the decline of colonialism in Africa. In the late 1950s and
early 1960s numerous African countries achieved independence
and by 1980 only one African country, Namibia, remained a
2
colony.
As Dr. Yassin El-Ayouty correctly stated, according to
the African political leaders: <
The right of the peoples to self-determination is a
categoric demand for which there shall be no excep
tion, a sort of a natural right valid in all places
and for all time, taking priority over all the other
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.3
Jut, though the long awaited independence had been achieved, it
See Chapters XI and XII of the Charter of the United
(lations Organization.
2
i The Republic of South Africa is still ruled by a
njiinority settler regime.
I 3
Yassin El-Ayouty, "The OAU After Ten Years," Compara-
ive Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 97.
was soon realized that gaining freedom was one thing while
remaining free from the political and economic clutches of the
former and new imperialist powers was another. The African
states were faced with another perilous confrontation, namely,
:he intrigues of imperialists to thwart their newly achieved
::reedom. In other words, the African leaders discovered that
while colonialism had been pushed out through the door, neo
colonialism, a much more dreadful version of imperialsim,
sneaked in through the window.
The Congo Crisis of the early 1960s gave credence to
the above realization. It provided a traumatic experience to
the young African states; it laid bare the realization that
the weaker and young states were powerless in defending their
rights against neo-colonialsim, a new brand of imperials im.
The Crisis marked the official importation of the Cold War to
the African soil, and provided a proxy-war-like situation be
tween the Soviet Union and the United States of America.
To the United States of America, the leadership and
economic policies of the duly elected Congolese Prime Minister,
Patrice Lumumba, were inimical to its economic and other in
terests. Above all, the feeling that Lumumba was leaning
ir
4
The U.S.S.R.; U.S.A. and China which were not colonial
powers, had by the early 1960s, started to gain influence in
Africa. As these powers have economic and political interests
Africa, they present the threat of neo-colonialism.
Mack H. Jones, "The Development of the Political Role
ofj the United Nations Secretary General, 1945-1967." (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1967), pp.132, 153.
U.S. Economic interest was motivated by Congo's mineral
3
towards the Soviet Union was taken to mean that he would make
the Congo a communist state, thereby preclude the expansion
of U.S. economic domination in Africa. Therefore, U.S. policy
makers declared that Lumumba must go; so he went, and the U.S.
g
was implicated.
The manner in which the Congo Crisis was handled by
the big powers working under the cover of the United Nations
convinced the African leaders of the necessity of setting up
an indigenous African organization to cater to Africa's in
terests. This regional organization was to play a role similar
to that of the Organization of American States which serves
the New World, or the Arab League which collectively serves
the Arab World.
Scope and Method
This thesis seeks to review and analyze the role of
the OAU in settling African political disputes. The study
starts with a brief account of the formation of the OAU and
Its Charter as well as the Protocol of Mediation Conciliation
and Arbitration. It proceeds with an examination of the part
ijrhile militarily Congo location in Africa is of great impor-
ance.
Mack Jones, "The Development of the Political
ijtole of the United Nations Secretary General," p. 152.
C.I.A. has been implicated in the deaths of
Lumumba and Kwame Nkrumah. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah also maintained
that Joseph Kasavuba and Moise Tshombe (who were implicated
tjy a U.N. Security Council Special Report on the death of
ljumumba) were members of Moral Re-Armament (MRA) , a U.S.A.
" ased movement which was supported and financed by the C.I.A.
played by the OAU in settling nine major selected disputes,
the selected disputes have been treated under three main
groups.
The first group deals with disputes involving borders
and irredentist territorial claims. The crises in the Maghreb
td in the Horn of Africa have been reviewed and analyzed here,
e second major selection treats disputes arising from seces-
I
sionist and subversive activities. Here, two major civil wars,
namely, the Biafran and Southern Sudanese rebellions have been
reviewed. Also treated here are the subversive activities of
trwo great African leaders, the late Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the'
former Ghanian leader and President Julius K. Nyerere of Tan
zania. Finally, the third group deals with the role of the
OAU in the liberation of Southern Africa. The struggle to
liberate Rhodesia is fully reviewed here.
The researcher1s conclusion gives a balance sheet of
the effectiveness of the OAU in settling African political
disputes, and ends with a recommendation for the creation of
Ml African High Command which I believe would make.the OAU
m^re effective in settling disputes.
The method employed was content analysis. I reviewed
b<boks, journals, documents, magazines, newspapers and other
mjimerous publications.
Regionalism
The use of regional arrangements in the maintenance of
world peace and security has been practiced for a long time.
Perhaps one of the earliest eloquent modern examples was in
1493 when Pope Alexander VI, the Christian world ruler at that
time, divided the non-Christain world between Spain and Portu
gal. In the 1494 Peace Treaty of Tordesillas, the New World
and West were placed under the Spanish sphere of influence
Q
while Portugal agreed to concentrate on Africa and the East.
A more recent example was the nineteenth century Monroe Doc
trine of the United States of America. By this declaration
the United States tried to prevent the regaining of South
America for Spain by the Quadrub Alliance. President Monroe
and Secretary of State Adams warned the Quadrub Alliance that:
"The American continents are no longer subjects of any New
European colonial establishments.1 What President Monroe
and his Secretary of State wanted to impress on both the
Quadrub Alliance in particular and other powers with vested
interests ir.< the Americas was that the United States regarded
bhe New World as her sphere of influence and control, and that
intruders will not be tolerated.
The point to be made here is that from the dawn of
civilization, leaders of powerful nations have always teen re
garded certain regions as being under their sphere of influence
Q
7John A. Garraty, The American Nation, History of the
United States, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 18.
1 The Quadrub Alliance was formed at the Congress of
Verona in 1822, and its members were Austria, Prussia, France
and Russia.
Garraty, American Nation, p. 206.
ind this unwritten international law has been respected. That
s why the U.N. Charter also acknowledges regionalism.
When drafting the U.N. Charter, leaders like Churchill
elieved that regional organization was a "strategy for pre-
12
erving spheres of influence" or as Inis Claude puts it,
... it was impossible to ignore the prevalence of
the wartime Churchill view that there should be
several regional councils, august but subordinate,
LandJ that these should form the massive pillars upon
which world organizations would be founded in majesty
and calm.13
Article 52 of the U.N. Charter recognizes the estab-
Lshment of regional organizations to deal with matters relat
ing to the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article states:^
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements, or agencies
for dealing with such matters relating to the
maintenances of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action ....
2. The members of the United Nations entering
into such arrangement or constituting such
agencies shall make every effort to achieve
pacific settlement of local disputes through
such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies before referring them to the Security
Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the
12Robert W. Gregg, International Organization in the
Western Hemisphere (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968),
1.
■"innis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems
and Progress of International Organization (New York; H. Woroff
Bo<|>k Manufacturing Co., 1956), p. 106.
Leland Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Simons, Char
ter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents (New Yk
Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 355.
development of pacific settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements
or by such regional agencies either on the
initiative of the states concerned or by
reference from the Security Council.
The main theory of regionalism assumes that the world is too big
d heterogenous, that people at opposite ends do not face the
same problems, or develop a common framework to solve them.
Within regionalism, it is claimed that:
. . . adaptation of international solutions to real
problems can be intelligently carried out and commit
ments by states to each other can be confined to
manageable proportions and sanctioned clearly evident
bonds of mutuality.15
On the basis of this theory, during the early phase of the
cond World War, the allied statesmen emphasized the regional
sroach to world security by claiming that:
. . . it was only the countries whose interests were
directly affected by a dispute who could be' expected
to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure
a settlement.i&
'ever, whether the regional organization is OAS, SEATO, NATO,
Warsaw. Pact, its main purpose is for the preservation of the
influence of the dominant powers within it. For example, with
out doubt, OAS and NATO serve the interests of the United States





Professor Liska has asserted that small state regionalism
cantaot survive without the big powers; he advances the following
15Inis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, p. 95.
Goodrich, Edvard and Simon, Charter of the U.N.
cit-ss Ruth B. Russell, A History of the U.N. Charter (Washington






reasons:17 (a) small state regionalism is impractical because
the inadequacy of weaker powers to ensure regional security
and welfare; (b) study of the Arab League and the Little Entent
veals a number of inherent disadvantages of small state re
gional cooperation.
Specifically, Liska1s study of the Little Entent and
Arab League reveals the following limitations of small-state
grsups:
1. Both brought together minor states formerly
belonging to large empires situated in strategic
areas but with inadequate defensive powers.
2. The incentive to association in both instances
was negative-the Arab states to affect Israel
and the Little Entent to check Hungary and
Bulgaria.
3. While both groups desired to expel great power
influence (France from the Middle East and
Russia, Italy and Germany from the Balkans) they
needed the aid of outside powers for stability:
France to support the Little Entent and the
United States and Britain to aid the Arab League.
synopsis the point Professor Liska ,has made is that small or
weak regional organizations are incapable of deterring aggression
therefore cannot preserve regional peace and security; and
t big powers influence will always be present.
Does the Organization of African Unity share some of the
limitation of small or weak regional organizations? The aim of
:1s endeavour is to review and analyze, through selected
Richard A Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Regional Poli
tics and World Order (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company,
1973), p. 221.Cites George Liska, "International Equilibrium '
142-148.
examples, the role of the OAU in settling African political dis
putes.
The OAU: Its Charter and Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
Before the charter of the Organization of African Unity
was: signed in Addis Ababa in 1963, there had been several at-
tenpts to bring together the political leaders of Africa. The
first of these took place at Accra, Ghana on April 5, 1958, where
oni year after Ghana's independence, the Ghanian Prime Minister
called the First Conference of All Independent States. The pur
pose of this gathering, was, according to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, to:
Exchange views on matters of common interests; to explore
ways and means of consolidating and safeguarding all inde
pendence; to strengthen the economic and cultural ties
between our countries; to decide on workable arrangements
for helping Africans still subject to colonial rule and to
examine the central problems of how to secure peace.18
In 1960, another Conference of Independent African
States was convened in Addis Ababa, and yet another, called All-
African People's Conference (AAP) took place in Cairo, Egypt in
early 1961. Specifically, the All-African People's Conference
was called to examine a number of hot issues and events taking
place in Africa, the Congo Crisis, disturbances in Algeria and
r parts of the continent as well as the trouble in Southoth
Afr ca.
19
There were some sub-regional groupings too. The
1 g
Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (New York: Inter
national Publishers, 1963), p. 136.
19
Ibid. , p. 139.
10
Brazaville Group comprising of the Francophone States was
formed in 1960. Its members were the former French colonies
except Togo, and included the former French trusteeship, Came-
20
roon and Madagasca. This group advocated close cooperation
ith France and it took a moderate stand with regard co decolo-
ization including the Algerian struggle; it supported Mauri-
21
tania's independence.
The policies of the Brazaville group were in direct
:onflict with another rival faction, the Casablanca Group,
'hich comprised the so-called radical states, namely, Egypt,
Igerian F.L.N. (Front de Liberation National), Ghana, Guinea,
li, Libya and Morocco. This group regarded the views of the
razaville group as an expression of continuing dependence and
[upporting neo-colonialism. It strongly supported Algeria's
truggle and "a unified military command for the struggle
Jgainst colonialism, and for opposing French nuclear test on
the African continent." Apart from its nuclear tests in the
sLhara, France evoked the anger of Nkrumah and his Casablanca
colleagues because of its refusal to comply with the stipula
tion of Article 76 of the charter of the U.N. concerning the
Trusteeship system, whereby the former mandated territories of
mganyika, Togo and Cameroon, were to be self-governed and
20Marion Mushkat, "Problems of Political and Organiza





independent later. But, France opposed the establishment of a
time table for its colonies and mandated territory, and in the
ase of Cameroon arrogantly claimed during a U.N. debate that:
For us, the question is simple, we are in Cameroon as
we are in Algeria or Senegal. We have been there for
nearly thirty years, we have given them men of first
order, we have expended considerable sums. For us
Cameroon and Togo are part of the French Union. The
French Union exists. Cameroon and Togoland are con
stituent parts, we refuse to accept that what only
concerned the French nation can be discussed inter
nationally. 23
ow could a territory in Africa, in the heart of Africa, be a
'nstituent part of a European power thousands of miles away?
is proposition was far too insulting for the Casablanca group
accept.
In any case, by the end of 1962, and noticeably after
Algeria's independence, the conflicts between the Casablanca
and Brazzaville blocs started to disappear. The latter group
seemed to have had an edge over the former; for the radicals,
especially after the Monrovia Conference, feared being isolated.
As| Marion Mushkat pointed out:
The fear brought about the high number of participants
in the Addis Ababa Conference on May 12, 1963, a quick
ratification of the Organization's Charter in spite of
the fact that it was formulated according to the prin
ciples of Afro-Malagash Organization.24
However, as the Heads of State and Government were
signing the OAU Charter in the early hours of Sunday, May 26,
23
Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroon,
Social Origins of the U.P.C. Rebellion (Oxford Press, 1977)
p. i20.
I Marion Mushkat, "Problems of Political and Organiza
tion Unity in Africa," African Studies Review (September 1970),
p. J274. See also Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (New York:
12
1963, to them, it was not a question of which bloc lost or won.
The Emperor of Ethiopia had this to say:
Experience has taught us that no matter how much one
would sustain hardship and struggle by oneself, one
would not submit or solve one's problems alone. Only
in determination of our will to solve it together, can
we discover strength and wisdom to guide us beyond the
horizon wherein lies the better life of our people.25
In his address to the 1963 Summit Conference, President
>ekou Toure of Guinea also stated that:
The Casablanca Charter and the Monrovia Charter were
attempts at African Unity and means of accelerating'
the historic progress in Africa. These means must
be marked into a single and unique Charter, the Charter
of United Africa.26
In the same Conference, speaking against a proliferation of
frican groupings, Crown Prince Hassan of Rida of Libya said:
Mutual understanding and closer cooperation among
African states is a necessity. We must avoid at
all costs the formation of African groupings which
tear and split the unity of Africa and create a real
danger to our security and existence. Such disunity
would only aid the imperialists to sow the seed of
discord and dissention among the African nations, to
the benefits of their selfish interests and colonial
objectives.27
Other leaders voiced their feelings in support of a
arter that covered the whole continent. For example, Presi-
nt Julius K. Nyerere argued:
The enemies of Africa are now praying. They are
praying for the failure of this conference. The
International Publishers, 1973), p. 286.
25
Zdenek Cervenka, OAU and Its Charter (London: C.





people of Africa are also praying. They are praying
for the triumph of Pan-Africanism over narrow national
ism and regionalism. They are praying for the triumph
of an all-embracing African Charter over a Monrovia or
Casablanca Charter.28
In fact, in that history making Conference, some
Leaders were convinced or at least, had the impression that by
signing the Charter, the previous groups were killed and buried.
Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr. Milton Obote said:
We have therefore agreed and are firmly resolved to
renounce the Casablanca and Monrovia Charters. Instead,
we have adopted and signed, for the first time in the
history of Africa—one Charter to guide our cause and
actions.29
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana quickly agreed with Dr.
MLlton Obote; he cried with joy: "We should be happy that at
long last, by the adoption of this Charter, we have seen the
end of the various groupings and regional blocs.
So, it could be said with a degree of justification
that the thirty-one African leaders who attached their signa
tures on the OAU Charter on May 26, 1963, were determined to
down play the importance of the various blocs and regional
organizations to which they belonged.
In spite of the haste in drafting and adopting it, the
Charter was very unique, as Dr. Wonoroff's apt comments
licated:
The Organization created in Addis Ababa was highly






structure ... a broad assembly of government delegates
and a narrow governing body ... largely adopted in the
United Nations family and elsewhere. They did not add
an unreal and powerless people's assembly. Rather, they
maintained and improved upon the structure that was
developing naturally on the continent.31
As mentioned earlier, the OAU Charter was a blend of the Mon
rovia and Casablanca Charters, which had started the develop-
ent of a framework peculiar to Africa. The introduction as
ell as articles two, three, five and six of the OAU Charter
|re based on the Afro-Malagash Union Charter.
The Supreme organ of the OAU Charter is a Summit Con
ference, which is now institutionalised as a yearly Assembly
of the Heads of States and Government. It is a unique set up
wnich takes cognizance of African tradition where it is the
responsibility of the leaders to meet and decide or take major
actions on important and grave issues. Even in the pre-state
era, the final decisions were made collectively by the elders.
In discussing an issue of importance, for example, a war,
di|spute over farming or fishing grounds, the clan heads or
chiefs of the disputing factions, after their emmissaries or
spDkesmen had paved the way, met to hear the dispute. They
had the final say in declaring a war or making peace. The
it Conference of< the OAU seems to reflect this tradition.
A Council of Ministers which is composed of the Foreign
Ministers of the member states in addition to other assigned
31Wonoroff, Organizing African Unity (New Jersey: The
Scajrecrow Press, Inc. , iy70), p. 155.
i 32Marion Mushkat, "Problems of Political and Organi
zational Unity," African Studies Review (September 1970), p.274.
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duties, helps to prepare the work for the African leaders.
They prepare the agenda for meeting of the Heads of State and
Government.
In order to promote cooperation in the ever expanding
fields in world activities, the OAU founding fathers created
pecialised Commissions to handle the administrative work and
lso to help prepare activities for the various bodies, an
Independent and permanent Secretariat was created. For the pur
pose of preserving peace, a Commission of Mediation, Concilia
tion and Arbitration was also created.
33
The OAU Charter stresses that member states adhere
to the principles of sovereignty, nonintervention in the in-
tiernal affairs of another state, right of independence and of
territorial integrity. The Charter also forbids political
assassinations and all forms of subversion. Finally, it calls
for the liberation of Africa.
The political situation in Africa at the time when the
Charter was being drafted necessitated the attention paid to
tike young states safety, the respect of the sovereignty of each
state, of noninterference by another state, of territorial in
tegrity of each state and so on. In fact, Article III, which
ia the heart of the OAU Charter, is like a Bill of Rights of
African States. If it was based on fear, or the desire to
ensure the safety of their states that caused this stress on
states rights, the leaders had a point. A look at the
33
Ibid., See also Article II and III of the OAU Charter.
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geographic and demographic makeup of the young states reveal
that these countries would in the future create problems of
their own. During the scramble for Africa the European powers,
.n drawing their colonial boundaries gave no consideration to
he historical divisions and cultures of the African people.
The artificial and arbitrary division of the continent was far
Jirom satisfactory to those colonized. It is not uncommon to
find people speaking the same language in two or more countries,
lor example, the Ewes are in Ghana, Togo and the Ivory Coast,
the Fulanis in Nigeria and Cameroon, the Somalis in Ethiopia,
Somalia, Kenya and so on. However, the leaders of the indepen
dent African states felt that the boundaries inherited from
their colonizers should remain in tact, for adjusting them
would only create more trouble.
The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration
Having accepted their inherited problems, the African
leaders aware of their military weakness, and as a means of
reducing friction and animosity among themselves, saw the neces
sity for setting up political machinery for peaceful settlements.
Under Article XIX the Heads of States and Government declared
that they:
Pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by
peaceful means and to this end, decided to establish
a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitra
tion. The composition of which and condition of ser
vice shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be
approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
i ment.
\onoroff, Organizing African Unity, p. 176.
17
The first draft of the Protocol of the Commission of
[ediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was started at the
irst Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal in August 1963.
At the Second Session in Lagos, Nigeria, the Council of Minis
ters appointed a Committee of Experts to do a thorough study of
he basic draft started in Dakar. The members of the Committee
.ncluded experts from Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia,
[anzania and United Arab Republic. Once more the Lagos draft
as expanded and polished by experts that met in Cairo, where
it was finally adopted. The African leaders who were also
meeting in Cairo, signed the Protocol on July 21, 1964 and it
became an integral part of the OAU Charter. In October 1965,
during the Accra OAU Summit, the Commission headed by Justice
A. Odesanga of Nigeria was appointed, but it was not until
67 that the first meeting of the Commission took place in
Addis Ababa.
The Commission consists of twenty-one members elected
by the Assembly for a duration of five years, with a provision
c re-election. It should be noted here that the Commission
viewed as an important organ of the OAU, hence it is the
embly of the Heads of State and Government, and not the
ordinate Council of Ministers or the Secretariat that must
oint members of this Commission. In electing officials,
basis for election allows the candidacy of no more than
representatives from a single state, but after the elec-
tio^i, the final composition cannot have more than one official









removed from office, except by a vote of two-thirds majority of
the total members of the Assembly. Here again, it should be
Inoticed how difficult it is to remove a member from the Commis-
ion. A consensus of two-thirds majority is not easy to be
obtained in an Assembly where leaders have diversified political
iews and where more often than not, on certain issues, their
nly agreement is not to agree. To make a complicated removal
rocedure more complicated, before a member is replaced, it
lust be proved that he is either incompetent or that he is
uilty of a certain misconduct. Members of the Commission are
arred from receiving or seeking instructions from any member
sjtate and are also protected by the privileges and immunities.
I The Commission is placed under a bureau composed of a
president and two vice presidents, who are elected by the
Assembly from among the members of the Commission. These top
officials are the only fulltime members. The remaining eigh
teen are called only when necessary. The seat of the Commis
sion is in Addis Ababa. It is important and necessary to note
tnat the Commission is not a permanent body but a panel of
judges and other experts who are "activated when disputes are
35
brbught to it for settlement."
The parties involved in a dispute can select from among
the twenty-two members those they wish to hear their case. Of
course, the large number of Commission members makes it pos
sible for several groups to be established simultaneously to
35Ibid., p. 177,
19
deal with several disputes.
The Commission's area of operation is limited to dis
putes between member states and has very little to do with a
conflict between a state and the OAU. Notwithstanding the num-
>er of judges it is comprised of, the Commission cannot inter
pret the Charter of the OAU. That is the duty of the Assembly,
either can it serve as an advisory body for the OAU; nor can
t give its opinion on legal matters concerning the OAU.36
For a dispute to be heard before the Commission, it
lust be put forward by one or more parties; by the Council of
jinisters or even the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Should one of the parties refuse to give in to the authority of
tne Commission, the Commission's Bureau may refer the matter
to the Council of Ministers. However, should one of the parties
continue to be adamant, arrogant and unyielding, there is nothing
the Commission and OAU can do, for when framing the Protocol of
the Commission, it was agreed that the Commission's authority
wculd be optional and not compulsory.
IOn the other hand when there is an agreement or when the
ties consent to the authority of the Commission, the mode of
ocutlement is next decided. The normal procedure is that the
parties, together with the Commission choose the working method
and rules of procedure. The members of the Commission, endowed




conducting investigations and other findings to get the facts
brought before it. Let us now specifically examine the three
branches of the Protocol.
The President of the Commission, with the consent of
the parties, together with one or more mediators chosen from
the Commission could introduce the mediation. Article XXI of
the Protocol spells out clearly that:
The role of the mediator shall be confined to recon
ciling the views and claims of the parties. The
mediator shall make written proposals to the parties
as expeditiously as possible. If the means of recon
ciliation proposed by the mediator are accepted, they
shall become the basis of a protocol of arrangement
between the parties.
Therefore, the primary task of the mediator is to try to recon
cile the various views and claims of both parties, mainly by
of giving confidential pieces of advice and recommendations
to the parties. No procedural rules are followed.
However, sometimes, and especially when diplomatic
relations have been broken, the method of Good Office, which
:onsists of a third state, an international organization or
»ven an individual or a number of individuals are employed to
ring disputing parties together for negotiation.38 It should
>e noted, as Dr. Zdenek points out, that "Good Offices do not in
volve any active assistance in reaching a settlement apart from
e-establishing contact between the disputants."
There ,is an upward trend in the use of mediators as
38
Zdenek Cervenka, O.A.U. and Its Charter, pp. 87-88.
39Ibid., p. 88.
21
the best possible solution. The Africans are great respecters
of elders as well as noble members in their communities. More
often than not, in the event of a quarrel, an elder's judgment
solves the problem. That is why on state level too, the OAU
has repeatedly made use of the services of the influential and
often elder statesmen. Usually, these leaders are able moder
ates, who have over long years been drenched by torrents of
political problems, but who stood the test of torture. How
ever, the complexity of modern problems and foreign interven
tions, plus the fact that states are beginning to feel secure,
make it increasingly difficult for negotiators to produce
tangible results.
Articles XXII and XXIII of the Protocol describes the
procedures, -while Article XXIV explains the duty of the Commis
sion of Conciliation. Under Article XXII the dispute to be
settled could be submitted to the Commission through a petition
forwarded to the President of the Board of Conciliation by one
>r more of the disputants. When the President receives the
>etition, after he has secured the agreement of the parties, he
sets up a Board of Conciliators, of which he appoints three
lembers while each party appoints one. The Chairman of the
loard, who must be among the five board members, is chosen by
:he President. Article XXIII specifies that no two members
:rom the country sit on the Board.
The duty of the Commission of Conciliation, as suc
cinctly explained in Article XXIV is to: "Clarify the issues
in dispute and to endeavor to bring about an agreement between
22
the parties upon mutually accepted terms." If there is no
agreement between the parties, the Board is empowered to deter
mine its own procedure. Article XXV makes it clear that the
parties could be represented by agents to act as go-betweens.
They may also be assisted by counsels and experts and other
persons who may be of help. At the end of the hearings the
Board writes a report indicating the success or failures of its
endeavour. The report is forwarded to the President of the Com
mission, with the approval of the parties it may be made public.
As elaborate as it is, the Commission of Conciliation
is hardly used and has never settled a dispute.
Essentially, the most distinguishable features of the
Commission of Arbitration are: (1) it is a court which bases
its fuling on international law, (2) the conclusions of the
Arbitration Tribunal are binding. Article XXVII of the Pro
tocol stipulates the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal in
the following manner:
1. The provision of arbitration by each party-
from the members of the Commission
2. A third person chosen from the Commission, with
the consent of the two arbitrators is made of
the Chairman of the Tribunal.
3. Should the two arbitrators fail to agree on the
choice of the person to chair the tribunal, the
Bureau shall appoint one.
It is specifically stated that the arbitrators shall
not be the nationals of the disputing parties, neither should
they have lived in or been employed in those countries.
Having agreed on this selection procedure, and believing
that recourse to arbitration is a submission in good faith, the
23
arties are bound to accept the outcome of the arbitration pro
ceedings. This stand is made clear in Article XXIX which
states that: The parties shall in each case, conclude a com-
romise which shall specify: (a) The undertaking of the par
ties to go to arbitration and to accept as legally binding, the
decision of the Tribunal, (b) the subject matter of the contro-
ersy, and (c) the seat of the Tribunal. In any case, in the
vent there is no compromise as stipulated by Article XXIX,
Article XXX rules that:
. . . that Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute
according to treaties concluded between parties, inter
national law, the Charter of the Organization of African
Unity and Charter of the United Nations ....
ike the Commission of Conciliation, disputes are hardly re-
erred to the Commission on Arbitration.
The Weakness of the Charters of the Organization
of African Unity and the Commission of
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
The apparent inability of the OAU to solve Africa's
olitical problems has been laid at the foot of its Charter and
ts Commission created for the sole purpose of settling dis
putes. The OAU Charter, in the view of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was
one of intent" and not of "positive action." This may be
iterpreted to mean that the Charter and the apparatus for set-
tLing disputes lacked the force to ensure that things were ^
NI
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Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana, The Autobiography of Kwame
crumah (New York: International Publishers; 1976), pp. 110-
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He also maintains that the differences among the African
leaders led to the drafting of a compromising Charter that
failed to provide what was really needed. He insisted that:
The nature of the embryonic institutions provided
for in the Charter, and the lack of provision for
an All-African High Command to give teeth to the
Organization, meant that the OAU suffered from the
start inherent weakness.42
Though it was intended to create peace among member
states, the non-interference clause in Article III of the OAU
Charter has instead helped to create more problems at worst,
or at best helped to hinder peace and good will. The concept
of "none-interference" needed a clear and less ambiguous defi
nition. It is true that the ideas and intentions expressed in
its principle are good and sound. It was intended to enhance
mutual trust as well as healthy relations among members; it
was inserted to make sure one country or those powerful African
states should leave the less fortunate and weak ones alone, but
as Mr. Vincent B. Thompson comments: "It inhibits states from
pronouncing on actions by individual states which some members
consider detrimental to the good of the continent."43 The
Charter, according to him failed to establish which issue might
cease to be a domestic and which may necessitate Pan-African
intervention. The murder of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, the first
Prime Minister of Congo Kinshasa (Zaire) offers an eloquent
example of the above. In March 1963, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah,
Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, p. 250.
Vincent Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of








esident of the Republic of Ghana, on behalf of the Ghanian
vernment, requested that the United Nations hold a public
aring on the Security Council's 1961 Special Report concerning
e death of Lumumba. In that report, Moise Tshombe of Katanga
d ex-President Joseph Kasavubu of the Central government were
iplicated. But, Mr. Adoula, the Prime Minister at the time,
behalf of his government vehemently protested and accused
ana of an "inadmissible infringement of the sovereignty of
44
ngo." With an apology, Ghana had to give up the request.
The Nigeria-Biafra war provided another problem created
a result of the non-interference principle of Article III of
te OAU Charter. The Federal Military Government of Nigeria,
aimed with this non-interference verse of the OAU Bible, claimed
at the war was an internal matter to be solved by Nigeria
one, and welcomed no one to interfere, except of course on
s side to keep nNigeria One." The Ibos who founded the state
Biafra, claimed their rights to be independent, citing his-
ry, human rights and the untold sufferings of the Ibos as
asons for their right to be free from Nigeria's domination.
Zambia, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Tanzania, agreed with Biafra
and recognized it as an independent state; the other OAU mem
bers either remained neutral or supported the Federal Military
Government. What a dilemma created by the OAU itself!
The OAU Charter is also silent on human rights viola-
3ns on the. continent. At the time when the Charter was
44Ibid.
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rafted, and even up to this date, there were scores of politi-
al prisoners languishing in jails, prisons and other under-
round confinement where cruelty is beyond description in some
African countries. The Charter made no provisions to check
isputes between them and their governments.
Mr. George Githu, a prominent Kenya-i journalist gives
picture of the flagrant inhumanity of certain African leaders
wtio cannot be checked because to do so would mean interferring
ip their domestic matters. He said:
When ruling presidents enter prison cells and spit on
their opponents, when others go to prison cells
personally to execute their detainees, when whole
ethnic groups are mercilessly decimated on spurious
grounds of national security, clearly men and women
of good will and conscience must ask themselves whether
they ought to be in league with people whose hands are
immersed in blood of innocent people, with states whose
soil is replete with skeletons of people whose crime
appears to be that men born of certain tribes and not
others.45
On its part the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
ard Arbitration has its own draw backs. The Commission for
Arbitration clearly shows this. In spite of the fact that it
draws its binding conclusion on rules of international law,
it is very ambiguous when it comes to defining 'award1 in its
ruling procedure. It is doubtful "whether the award is to be
rendered by a majority vote of the arbiters;" and the Protocol
is not explain "the interpretation of an award, the mode ofdo
re /ision of award and whether the award settles disputes
45
Quoted by Dr. Ali Masuri in his article "Rights of
States or People: Where Should the O.A.U. Focus," New Africa
(August 1977), p. 179.
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finitely and without appeal." Furthermore, there is no
ovision on the enforcement of the award and the Protocol
ils to stipulate what would be done if a party fails to com-
y with the tribunal decision.
Yet another great weakness of both the Charter and Com-
mission for settling of disputes lies in the fact that both
iled to define OAU and U.N. relationship in handling African
sputes. Members of the OAU also belong to the U.N.; and as
mbers of the U.N. African countries are entitled to submit
sputes to the Security Council, General Assembly, or the World
urt of Justice. Somewhere along the line, it was necessary
fcr either the OAU Charter or the Protocol to explain or indi-
te when and where an OAU member could take its case to the
we rid body.
To conclude, on the failures of weaknesses of the OAU
charter, there can hardly be any other suitable comments than
those made by President Numeiri of Sudan, the 1979 Chairman of
the Organization of African Unity, when he said: "As it stands
[ttie OAU Charterj , it discourages any serious discussion and
leaves problems for time, the great healer, to solve."
46
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CHAPTER II
THE SETTLEMENT OF BORDER DISPUTES AND
IRREDENTIST TERRITORIAL CLAIMS
When at least two adjacent parties have irreconcilable
territorial ambitions, a boundary dispute exists. It has
repeatedly been mentioned that the partition of Africa during
the period if its colonization has resulted in the prolifera
tion of boundary problems facing the continent today. This is
so because the present demarcations do not represent the terri-
2
torial culmination of locally generated political process.
This is to say, these superimposed divisions "generate conflicts
by
xn
creating a disjunction between the interaction of the socio-
3
cultural system on one hand, and the political on the other,"
the areas involved.
When drafting the OAU Charter, the founding fathers
we:re concerned with the future of African states borders. This
consideration led them to include in the OAU Charter Article
Three Clause Three, a pledge to respect the sovereignty and
Carl Widstrand, African Boundary Problems (The
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Uppsala, 1969).
2Ravil Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited








itegrity of each state and also its inalienable right to inde-
endent existence. During the heroic and unprecedented 1963
jmmit Conference of the OAU, several leaders gave their views
oi how they felt about the boundary issues. For example, Presi-
snt Tsiranana of Madagascar stated that:
It is no longer possible, nor desirable, to modify the
boundaries of nations, on the pretext of racial, reli
gious, or linguistic criteria ... should we take these
criteria for settling our boundaries, a few states in
Africa would be blotted from the map.4
This view was similar to that of Ethiopia whose Prime Minister
sclared: "It is in the interest of all Africans now to respect
frontiers drawn on the maps, whether they are good or bad,
i the former colonizers. President Modibo Keita of Mali, it
ems to me, made the strongest case in favor of maintianing
e status quo. He warned:
We must take Africa as it is, and we must renounce
any territorial claims, if we do not wish to intro
duce what we might call black imperialism in Africa
.... African Unity demands of each one of us com
plete respect for the legacy that we have received
from the colonial system, that is to say: mainten
ance of the present frontiers of our respective states.
The prevailing feelings among most African leaders was
accept without alteration boundaries of their countries be-
athed by their former masters. There were a few exceptions
though. Between 1957 and 1963, for example, the African labour
+Samuel Chime, The O.A.U. and African Boundaries. Carl
Widstrand, African Boundary Problems, p. 65'. :—
Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent
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problems prior to the formation of the OAU, since 196J the num
ber of border disputes has increased. The first of the disputes
confront the OAU was a border conflict between Algeria and
31
political party conferences condemned the existing boundaries
e obsolete and superfluous. Strong advocate of this opinion,
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, had always viewed Africa's boundaries
impediment to African Unity. Though there had been boundary
to
Morocco.
The Algeria-Morocco Border Dispute
Before France colonized Algeria in 1830, the Maghreb
q
region was nominally subject to Moroccan rule. The present day
Algeria and Mauritania were subject to Moroccan governors. In
Morocco's long history, its rulers, the Berbers who were con
verted to Islam and intermarried with the Arabs, never saw the
wisdom and need for an accurate delineation of the Moroccan
Emdire.10
But the occupation of Tlemcem in Algeria by France,
changed the situation. In order to repel the intruders, the
Moroccans, led by Abdul El Kader, started raiding the French
forces in Algeria. This was stopped in 1844 when Marshall
7Ibid., pp. 84-85.
Q
For example, Somali and Ethiopia since 1951, Morocco-
Algsria, Morocco-Mauritania since 1956.
q
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 337.
Anthony Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundary: A
Factual Background," in Journal of Modern African Studies, vol.
1, no. 3 (1963), p. 315.
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Bugteaud defeated the Moroccan forces. As soon as Morocco was
cor.quered it was stripped of its outlying provinces, and made a
prc
However, the Tangiers Convention of 1844 failed to
clearly define the boundary between Morocco and Algeria. It only
vaguely stated that "The boundary was to remain the same as when
13
Algeria was under Turkish domination." Even when France was
in complete control of Morocco, nothing was done to clarify the
boundary position. During the period of French protectorate,
for
the
tectorate; Algeria was made a constitutional part of France;
12
example, the official position concerning the area south of
Kessours was still what was stipulated by the 1845 Treaty
which stated that "The lack of water which rendered the desert
inhabitable also made its delineation superfluous." Up to
1956 when Morocco gained independence, France was unable to pro
duce any reliable maps showing the boundary between Morocco and
Algeria. After 1956, Morocco opened negotiations with France
for the settlement of the problem. As the negotiations were not
producing any positive results, Morocco stopped them and opened
direct negotiations with the Algerian National Liberation Front
(FLN). The freedom fighters promised that full and meaningful
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Morocco had to wait, Morocco's dream of settling the dispute
never materialized when Algeria became independent in 1962.
The refusal to negotiate the issue by the Algerians,
covpled with the discovery of oil and other minerals in the dis
puted area, was the immediate cause of the crisis between Mo
rocco and Algeria in 1963. On October 1, 1963, Morocco sent its
troops to occupy the frontier posts of Hassi-Beida and Tinjoub
ch she claimed were on her side of the border. After one
week, the Algerian forces counter attacked, dislodged the Mo
roccan forces and took over the posts. By October 14, 1963,
ful L scale war had broken out along the border.
Coincidentally, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia was
touring the Maghreb when the war erupted. On October 17, he
rushed to Marrackech with a peace offer to King Hassan II, then
flew to Algeria. He persuaded the two leaders to find a peace
ful solution to the crisis.17 Morocco insisted on direct nego-
18
tiations, but Algeria perferred the OAU intervention, arguing
thai: Algeria cannot negotiate the border issue with Morocco
because the OAU Charter called for the maintenance of territorial
I TO
status quo on Africa.
Morocco could not go along with the idea of having the
mediate because of the views expressed at the 1963 AddisOAU
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 337.
17Ibid., p. 338.
18
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Ad£.ba Summit Conference calling for the preservation of inherited
20
colonial boundaries. In any case, after vigorous diplomatic
pel suasion concerning various mediation proposals, King Hassan










The two day meeting, lasting from October 29 and 30,
196J3, succeeded in bringing the two parties to an agreement and
in
Bamako. The Malian President's role as a mediator was appeal-
to both Algeria and Morocco. President Keita shared similar
ological views with Ben Bella of Algeria, while the assumption
t Mali too was dissatisfied with the Saharan borders and as a
King's respect. Emperor Haile Selassie's strong opposition
the alteration of African borders made it possible for Algeria
accept him, while his deep conservatism encouraged King Hassan
accept him.
21
issuing of joint communique which contained the following
22
main points:
1. Acceptance of a cease fire.
2. The creation of a demilitarized zone which limits
were to be determined by a commission composed of
Algerian, Moroccan and Ethiopian officers. The
Malian and Ethiopian officers were to supervise
the observance of the demilitarization agreement.
20
Ibid. When signing the OAU Charter, Morocco attached
to its signature, a reservation stating that the signature should'
not be interpreted as a recognition of existing borders, nor as
a renunciation of Morocco's rights.
21
Saadia Touval, "The O.A.U. and African Borders," in
International Organization (November 1, 1967), p. 107.
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3. The ceasation of hostile propoganda and
interference in the internal affairs of
each other.
4. An early meeting of the OAU Council of
Ministers was requested. It was hoped
that the meeting of the Council of Minis
ters would quickly establish an arbitra
tion commission which would be charged with:
(a) Ascertaining the responsibilities for
the outbreak of hostilities.
(b) Examining the border problem and sub
mitting recommendations to Algeria and
Morocco for the settlement of the dispute.
In accordance with point four above, an extraordinary session of
the OAU was convened in Addis Ababa, from 15-18 November 1963.
The attendance of all thirty-two members of the organization
attested to the importance of the session. The Emperor's warning
at the start of the proceedings added more weight to the grave
and
situation. He admonished: "Africa's ability to deal with her
own problems, free of outside interference or influence is in the
balance. Failure would deal acripppling blow .... The Em
peror's opening remarks notwithstanding, each party stood firm
on its original position, and blamed each other for the troubles.
Morocco presented her case and stressed her wish to regain part
of her territory France detached from her in the nineteenth cen
tury. But Bouteflika, the Algerian foreign minister, retorted
warned the Council that:
To wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of
the Algerian-Moroccan border is without doubt to create
23
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a precedence or an unfortunate jurisprudence for
the future of many African states.2A
For two days the deadlock was insurmountable. At the end of the
deliberations, the Council's success seemed to be only a resolu
tion which among other things said:
. . . the unwavering determination of the African state
to always seek a peaceful and fraternal solution of all
differences that may arise among them by negotiations
and within the framework of the principles and the
institutions prescribed by the Charter of the Organiza
tion of African Unity.25
However, before the Council ended its sitting, in keep
ing with the Bamako rulings calling for the establishment of a
26
commission of arbitration, after careful selection, Ethiopia,
Mali, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Sudan and Tanganyika were chosen to
forn an ad hoc commission. The commission's terms of reference
wers those of the Bamako agreement listed under item 4, a and b,
above. But unlike the stipulations of the previous agreement
which called for the establishment of a body of arbitration,
the ad hoc commission of seven was to act only as mediators or
I 27
good offices. Both Algeria and Morocco refused to accept a
binding decision on their territorial dispute.
In the meantime, while the Council of Ministers was
meeting, the cease-fire commission established at Bamako
24
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immediately went to work to end the crisis, at least to stop the
fighting. By February 20, it was successful in enforcing the
withdrawal of the forces, and also defined the demilitarized zone,
Its work was terminated in April.
The problems facing the OAU ad hoc commission of seven
made progress extremely difficult. Dr. Woronoff's detailed ac
count of the precarious situation is very informative. He sum
marizes the difficulties as follows:
In trying to settle the border dispute, the commission
could not make progress either. The titles and claims
of both parties were mutually exclusive. The Moroccans
demanded that the French administrative measures be
disregarded and that the territory taken from it by
France be returned. Morocco no longer had such exten
sive claims as during the Muritanian conflict, limiting
itself to a specific but viable area running from Figuig
to the ... region of Tindout and iron mines of Gara-
Djebilet Algeria, for its part, insisted that the
whole area had been part of its territory at independence
and demanded respect of the colonial frontiers.29
The ad hoc committee met at Abidjan on December 2-6,
whore rules of procedure were adopted. Another meeting took
place in Bamako, Mali, on December 24-26. Here the disputants
submitted their cases. A report of this meeting was made to the
Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers sitting in
Laj;os in February 1964. Dr. Woronoff also points out that there
was; sign of progress and understanding, for in May 1964, both
countries agreed to resume direct negotiations.
The Commission held other meetings in Bamako,
28
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Casablanca, Algeria and in Cairo. In the last location, it met
to orepare a report to the Council of Ministers Conference. By
thi
men
3 time, the crises were almost over. However, the develop-





30sittings of the ad hoc commission.Jyj The venues of the next
rounds of talks were Khartoum, Algiers, Rabat and Nairobi. Still,
by t:he time the Council of Ministers met in Nairobi and Accra
in February 1965 and October 1965 respectively, the ad hoc com
mission was unable to come up with any recommendation acceptable
to the two parties. Notwithstanding the failure to produce an
agreement, the relationship between Morocco and Algeria was im
proving. In mid April 1965, prisoners of war were exchanged; by
May, a joint Algerian-Moroccan committee was formed to facilitate
restoration of calm along the border.31 King Hassan II and
3ella met in Saidia, near the frontier. There the two war-
leaders praised the improvement in their relations. This
:Lng marked the end of the dispute. On June 18, 1965, the
two Countries exchanged ambassadors.
The smooth relations were first strained by the over-
throj of Ben Bella shortly after the Saidia meeting. The new
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cal and less conciliatory. Algeria moved its troops into
area claimed by the Moroccans, and on May 22, 1966 it nation-
ed the mines. The next day, as Dr. Woronoff reports, Rabat
sed Algeria of occupying part of the demilitarized zone in
rant violation of the cease-fire agreement. Tension rose
again, but this time, instead of resorting to war, Morocco
atched envoys to Emperor Haile Selassie and President Modibo
a who were guarantors of the settlement, and demanded an
33
:nt meeting of the ad hoc commission. The mediators acted
kly but before the ad hoc commission met in July, the crisis
over. However, the dispute continued. In the subsequent
ings of the commission, Algeria made the situation more dif
ficult. President Boumedienne repudiated the Algerian-Moroccan
agreements reached in Addis Ababa and also retracted concessions
by his predecessor.
34
President Boumedienne's hard line was motivated by what
he thought to be the United States interference in the Maghreb.
stablishment of U.S. bases in Morocco and Tunisia, President
dienne felt that his country's security was threatened. So,
he had to reject the Moroccan and Tunisia border claims and in
sisted that Algerian's frontiers could not be negotiated.
Finally in February 1967, Algeria stated that it would not cede
an inch of its territory and would defend its borders "with
33
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While the OAU was able to pacify the disputants, it
not able to settle permanently the dispute between Algeria
Morocco. From 1967 on Algeria has been spending vast sums
loney to strengthen its armed forces so as to defend its
ers against any aggressor. This arms bu:ld up caused so
worry to Morocco that on March 2, 1967, King Hassan asked
United Nations Secretary General to dispatch a commission
lorth Africa "to stop the arm race.
The mediators who successfully negotiated a cease-fire
.ng the 1963 crisis did so because King Hassan and Ben Bella
willing to listen and adhere to the OAU's authority. The
power interference was not overtly present. It is doubtful
he mediation would have been successful if Boumedienne was
ower in 1963. It seems to me that the National Liberation
t of Algeria would not have taken such a hard line had it
been for the United States military moves in the region,
tfully, Algeria had a genuine fear. The United States has
friendly to Morocco for a very long time. Its military
ence in Morocco or any country in the Maghred was sympathe-
to the Moroccan aspirations. Morocco's fears of an arms
in the region are also genuine. The standstill in this
conflict can only be decided by the combined efforts of the big




sinilar pattern of events is observed in the next dispute.
The Somali-Ethiopia and Somali-Kenya Border
Disputes in the Horn of Africa
Ari
the
Before the nineteenth century, partition of the Horn of
ca, Ethiopia's rule, going back to the first century and the
per|iod of the Axum Empire, extended from the Shoan Plateau to
37
coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
The Somalis too, mainly pastoral nomads who claim their
connlnon descent from the lineage of Prophet Mohammed, have lived
undisturbed and unmolested in the Ogaden as long as the Ethio
pians. They are bound together by the traditional attachment of
kingship, language and religion. But the colonialist superim
posed boundary between Ethiopia and the northern region of
Somali Republic on one hand, and the Somali-Kenya on the other
hand, divided the Somalis among Ethiopia, Somali and Kenya.
Sue* a division of the Somali nation has been resisted by the
Some li Republic. The aim of the Somalis was the creation of a
greater Somali Nation-State which would place within its confines
all the Somali people. But, to realize their goal, it would
have meant taking over a territory about one fifth of the area
of Ethiopia and one-quarter of the area of Kenya where the
37
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dum supporting its claims before the U.N. General Assembly.
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ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA-KENYA CRISIS
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Source: Saadia Touval,


























is live outside Somalia.
To show their determination to achieve Somali reunifica-
the Constitution of Somali Republic called for the unifica-
of the Somalis. Furthermore, Somalia, like Morocco, re-
to be bound by the OAU resolution which advocates respect
.herited boundaries. Somalia repeatedly argued and claimed
the Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia had the right of self-
mination as advocated by the U.N. Charter. On their parts,
thiopians and Kenyan governments retorted that "the prin-
of self-determination did not apply to territories within
endent states' and moreover, that the Somalis dream was
st the principles of the OAU Charter which calls for respect
herited boundaries.
As it was expected, the relationship between Somalia and
eighbors strained soon after the Republic of Somalia was
in 1960. As agitation for reunification increased, tension
mounted along the Somali-Ethiopia border where nearly one
on Somalis in Ogaden never recognized the boundary line; with
cattle they freely crossed the frontier. They resented
pia's presence and occasionally raided their enemy posts.
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 348. See also
a Touval, "The O.A.U. and African Unity," in International
ization (November 1, 1967), p. 111.
See Article 6, Clause 4 of the 1960 Constitution of
epublic of Somalia.
Samuel Chime, "The O.A.U. and African Boundaries," in
























ctual fact, the raids were conducted by Shiftas.
Soon after the OAU was formed, the Somalis submitted
r problem to the organization. In May 1963, President Adden
lla Osman 3aar of Somalia argued Somalis' case and pleaded
a reunification of the Somalis territories, adding with a
ing that if unresolved the problem "will constitute a con-
t source of trouble in the region, and may affect adversely
friendly relations between the Somali Republic and her neigh-
s.
,43
This speech brought a sharp reply from the Ethiopian
e Minister who emphasized the wisdom of preserving the status
and also warned that many African states will cease to exist
oundaries were redrawn for any reason.
During the 1963 May Summit Conference, Kenya was not yet
pendent, was represented by a delegation of the Kenya Afri-
National Union (KANU). The delegation distributed a memo-
um which severely excoriated the Somalian government's sup-
for the secession of the Somalis inhabited Northern Fron-
District (NFD) from Kenya. Professor Touval asserts that
Kenyan Memorandum accused Somalia of following Tshombe's
ssionist footsteps, regarded the move as tribalistic and
e all as threatening the territorial integrity of all
The Shiftas were Somali nationals who mingled with the
Som li nomads and then attacked the Ethiopians. To the Somalis,
Shiftas were regarded as nationalists. While Ethiopia and
a viewed them as bandits.
43




The failure of the OAU Summit to produce any tangible
solution to settle the dispute resulted in the escalation of hos-
til:
Ken'
to t:he West for military aid. Professor Saauia observes further
that: the United States of America, Italy, and West Germany agreed
to offer ten million dollars of military aid. This offer, ac
cording to the Somalis, was too little. So, in 1963, she ac
cepted a thirty million dollar offer by the Soviet Union. Soma
lia
the
ties. To improve its armed forces (since both Ethiopia and
a had superior armies and equipment), Somalia first appealed
was able to expand her forces to 20,000 men and strengthened
air force as well.
45
With the feeling that they could stand up to the Ethio
pians, the Shiftas escalated raids into Ethiopia, and at the same
time Somalia launched an intensive propaganda campaign over the
air and by the press. Both sides mobilized their regular armies
and on Fenruary 7, 1964, full scale fighting started.
When fighting broke out, Somalia informed the OAU Secre
tariat about it. In personal messages, the Somali leader asked
certain African heads of state to intervene. However, according
to PJrofessor Saadia, Somalia very much wanted the United Nation
Security Council, instead of the OAU, to handle the matter.46 On
44
Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent
Afri|ca, p. 84.
45Ibid., p. 147.
Saadia Touval, "The O.A.U. and African Boundaries," in
International Organization (November 1967), p. 111.
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February 9, Somalia made a formal request for an urgent meeting
of i:he Security Council. To its disappointment, this request
was not granted because the African delegates of the Security
Council felt that the OAU, being an African regional organiza
tion, was best suited to handle the dispute; U. Than't, the
Unit:ed Nations Secretary General agreed with the Africans' views.
For her part, also on Febraury 9, Ethiopia requested
that an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers be
called to discuss Somalia's aggression. Somalia replied the fol
lowing day and made a similar request and charge against Ethiopia.
In the meantime, at Tanganyika's request, an extraor
dinary Council of the Council of Ministers had been scheduled to
meet in Dar es Salaam, Capital of Tanganyika, on February 12,
1964 to consider the situation arising from the army mutinies
in E|ast Africa.47
When the Council met on February 12, it was only after a
heatsd debate that the hostility taking place in the Horn was
included in the agenda. As it was expected, the disputants
accused each other of invasion or armed aggression, and none of
them was willing to retreat. Heavy fighting continued along the
Ethiopia-Somali border. After a week, both sides saw that
solv:.ng the dispute by force was impracticable at the time; they
gave in to peaceful means. The Council of Ministers refused to
accept either version of the charges and counter-charges, but













was to ask the disputants themselves to: Order an immediate
e-fire and to refrain from all hostile actions and stop, "all
ng of provocation of insulting nature by all media of
,,48
The resolution also asked African states
with diplomatic or consular missions in Ethiopia and Somalia to
49
assist in the observance of the cease-fire. Later on a five
nation commitee was formed and ordered to monitor the situation.
The cease-fire demand was obeyed. Prime Minister Ibrahim Ab-
bouiid of Sudan arranged the truce, on February 15, 1964.
But the truce was not fully observed, and as a result
the Council of Ministers met in Lagos, on February 24, the
lem was discussed all over again. In order to observe its
liance, Somalia insisted that observers be sent to supervise
cease-fire. Even though Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia and Congo
laville supported Somalia's views, Ethiopia did not favour it,
51
so it was dropped.
The Somali-Kenya dispute was also discussed. The Somali
representative still claimed the right of self-determination of
his people living in Kenya; while the Kenyan delegate reiterated
his country's stand stated previously, that the right of self-
determination was inapplicable to people living in independent
^Joronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 351.
49
Samuel Chime, "The O.A.U. and African Boundaries," in
Widstrand, African Boundary Problems, p. 72.
50.
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Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 351.
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The disputes were then referred to committees where
sures to ease immediate tension were discussed. Before the
council's setting ended two resolutions were passed. The one
on the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict confirmed the OAU resolution
passed in Dar es Salaam, and asked the two governments to
observe the cease-fire as well as opening direct negotiations.




the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and
its inalienable right to independent existence,"52 which the
es Salaam declaration did not mention. How could the
Somalis be asked to respect the sovereignty of Ethiopia when they
wanted Ogaden which was part of Ethiopia? Of course, the Lagos
resolution failed to mention sending of observers to the cease-
fir => zone. The resolution on the Somalia-Kenya dispute was
similar to the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute.
On the whole, the Lagos Council of Ministers handled the
set element of the Horn disputes differently from its previous
treatment of the Algerian-Moroccan crisis. As Professor Touval
funher points out, in Lagos, there was a conspicuous absence of
an ad hoc commission. The failure to appoint one, Touval asserts,
wasjprobably due to "some disenchantment with the results achieved
by i:he ad hoc commission on the Algeria-Morocco dispute."53 It















isters ventured to solve the new problems in a new way by
ting the disputants themselves, as much as possible, try to
tie their differences.
In compliance with the Lagos resolution, in March 1964,
Ethiopian and Somalis Foreign Ministers met in Khartoum,
prisingly, this meeting was unusually successful. Despite
fact that there were repeated hostile actions along the war
e, the talks continued. On March 30, satisfactory cpnclu-
ns were reached. Apart from agreeing to a cease-fire, it
also decided that troops should be withdrawn six to nine
es from the border. A joint commission to supervise the with-
iwal of the forces was agreed upon. The two countries also
eed to end hostile propaganda and to continue direct talks on
border problem. Though incidence of fresh fighting con-
ued, the cease-fire was finally put into effect on April 2,
shortly afterwards, a mixed Somali-Ethiopian cease-fire
The next round of talks between the foreign ministers of
two states took place in Cairo, in July 1964. The report of
talks and other negotiations between the two countries would
e been presented to the OAU Council Ministers taking place at
same date and venue, but the. internal crisis in Somali corn-
led the Somalis delegate to ask for a "postponement of the
ks and deletion of the item concerning the Ethiopian-Somalian
352.
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Ibid. See also Woronoff, Organizing African Unity,
Ibid.
and
In the meantime, Ethiopia and Kenya had concluded a
defense agreement. The Somalis were highly critical of it,
cali.ing that deal "a threat to the concept of African Unity" and
pleided to the OAU to "denounce such a pact," for it threatened
the
The Horn was still plagued by unceasing hostilities; in







Somalian-Kenyan disputes from the agenda."
balance of power in Africa.
58
to invite the OAU Commission to investigate the situation of
Somali refugees fleeing from Ethiopia and Kenya. The OAU
59
not act. Once more, Ethiopia and Somalia, on October 1965,
agreed to continue with the establishment of a joint commission
in fulfillment of the Khartoum agreement.
Somalia also tried to settle its problem with Kenya. It
Kenya that took a different kind of measure to end the dis
pute . First, Kenya tried to contain the Somali nomads by settl
ing them in villages called manyattas, for the purpose of soc
ializing them in the Kenyan society. This purely political
tactic aimed at cutting off contacts between the real Somalis
nomads and the Shiftas. This policy failed, for the raids
Saadia Touval, "The O.A.U. and African Boundaries," in
International Organization (November 1967), p. 116.
58
Samuel Chime, "The O.A.U. and African Boundary Prob
" in Carl Widstrand, African Boundary Problems, p. 73.
























inued. To put more pressure on the Somalis, in November
, Kenya had to sign a military defense pact with Ethiopia,
did not help the situation either.
Another major initiative to end the dispute was taken
resident Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, when in December 1965,
nvited the Somali leader, President Aden Abdulla Osman and
ident Jomo Kenyatta for a meeting in Arusha. As usual,
her party was willing to compromise, and so the conference
d in a fiasco.
61
Still, peace efforts did not cease. When Mohammed Ibra-
Egal became Somali's head of State.in 1967, things started
ake a new turn. He was well aware of the poverty and small
lation of Somali and so he was eager to make peace, though,
ourse, not at the expense of the Somalis claim. During the
hasa Summit, the intervention by President Kenneth Kaunda
ambia resulted in a major reconciliation between Somalia
Kenya. On September 13, 1967, both countries agreed to
62
e fighting and to resume diplomatic relations. This
ement was further incorporated into the OAU resolution on
ember 14, which called for respect of each others sove
reignty and territorial integrity. The two countries pledged
ettle their differences peacefully in keeping with the OAU
Samuel Chime, "The O.A.U. and African Boundary Prob-
," in Carl Widstrand, African Boundary Problems, p. 73. See
Saadia Touval, The O.A.U. and African Boundaries, p. 117.
also Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 356.
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 352.
ter
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Cha::ter. To crown it all, on October 28, a memorandum of
understanding was signed by President Kenyatta and Prime Minis-
Egal at a meeting in Arusha. On February 1, 1968, the two
countries exchanged ambassadors.
Since then, there have been sporadic hostile incidents.
The situation could be likened to a volcano TThich every now and
then emits lava, rumbles without eruption and often appears dor
mant:, but never extinct. The OAU is like baffled scientists
watching the unpredictable volcano in the Horn.
The situation in the French colony of French Somaliland
impeded peace progress in the Somali-Ethiopia dispute. In 1960
Italian and British Somalilands joined together to form the





This tiny territory was important to both Ethiopia and
Somali. To Ethiopia, economically, it was the terminus of the
Franco-Ethiopian railway. Ethnically, the Danakilis or Afars
inhabit the countryside are related to the nearby popula-who
65
in Ethiopia. On the other hand, Somalia also had a gen-
claim. First of all,: the area in disupte was a third part
of Somalia that was occupied by France. As the name of the
territory indicates, the Somalis regarded it as part of their





inhabitants of the colony were Somalis.
The territory's issue was first brought to the OAU by
way of the OAU Committee on Liberation Movements in June 1963.
The Committee visited Ethiopia and Somalia to interview the
nationalists leaders from the disputed territory. This Com-
mittiee, according to Professor Touval, avoided taking side in
the
On S
Somali-Ethiopian struggle over the territory. It was not
untijl 1966 that conflict took a sharp turn for the worst.
In August 1966, General Charles de Gaulle visited
Djibouti and promised a referendum to decide the colony's future.
eptember 16, 1966, the Emperor warned that: "Djibouti in
disputably is ours and its people know they belong to Ethio-
pia.'67
At Somalia's request, the question of the colony was
placed on the agenda of the Extraordinary Session of the Assem
bly of Heads of State and Government sitting in Addis Ababa in




referendum. The said referendum took place in March 1967,
the Afars obtaining sixty percent of the votes. The re
sults greatly infuriated the Somalis who protested and complained
to the OAU that voting had been rigged.0
Saadia Touval, The O.A.U. and African Borders, p. 118
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 357.
68See O.A.U. Resolution CM/RES. 480 (XXVII) passed by the
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Addis Ababa on October 12, 1976.
















Instead of joining either Ethiopia or Somalia, the for
mer colony changed its name to Afars and Issa and decided to
have loose ties with France. With the support of the OAU, the
territory became independent on June 27, 1977, and was called
the Republic of Djibouti. Ethiopia welcomed the new status of
the former French colony, declaring that it v»as "ready to safe
guard the security and unity of the new state."
The Somalis-Ethiopia border dispute has lingered on.
After the fighting and strained relations in the 1960s when no
solution was found, the OAU tried again in the early 1970s.
During the 1973 Summit Conference, the General Assembly appointed
Lght member Good Offices Committee, chaired by General Gowon
geria. The Committee held hearings at Mogadishu and Addis
The long talks with President Siyad Barre and the Em-
produced no tangible results.
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The downfall of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974 and the
quent rise to power of the Marxist oriented Dergue coupled
the Palace Coup which brought in the strongman, Lt. Col.
stu, created a confused situation in Ethiopia. The
is took advantage of the situation by increasing the number
ids into Ethiopia. From February 1978 on, the Shiftas
advanced steadily. Though faced with another war with the
s in Eritrea, Ethiopia prepared for a full scale
Colin Legum, ed. African Contemporary Record, New York:
ana Publishing Company, 1977-78,,vol. 10, 1977-78, p. 286.
Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The O.A.U. in 1974,"
lin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record (1974-1975),
5-26.
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confrontation with the Somalis in Ogaden. By June 1978, full
scale war involving the regular armies of the two countries
began.
The OAU tried to intervene. On August 8, 1977 a special
Mediation Commission convened in Gabon. It failed to achieve
any success because Somalia walked out of the meeting. After
wards, Ethiopia took a very hard line, declaring that "there
can lie no cease-fire or negotiations until the forces of aggres-
,,72
sion are completely with drawn from Ethiopian territory." And
so, the cruel war, which had turned to be a proxy-super power
confrontation, with the Soviets and Cubans on the side of the
73
Ethiopians, and the United States on Somalis's side continued.
Though Somalia lost the fight and withdrew its regular army in
1978,
with
the Western Somalis Liberation Front (WSLF) is carrying on
the war in Ogaden.
Some Somali students who actually took part in the 1977-
78 walr, told the writer of how determined the Somalis freedom
fighters are. They claim that the Somalis lost a battle, not a
war in Ogaden, and that fighting will continue.
The Polisario Struggle in the Maghreb
The Western Sahara, the territory in dispute, was
originally called "The Province of Spanish Sahara." It was a
Spanish protectorate established in January 1885. It extends
from Cape Blance in the South to Tarfaya in the North. It is
T)
Colin Legum, African Contemporary Record (1977-78),
73Saadia Touval, The O.A.U. and African Borders, p. 126.
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bounded on the East by the North Atlantic Ocean, North by





According to Professor Reyner, the region was defined
the first time by the Franco-Spanish Convention of June
1900. Further agreements between Spain and France, and particu
larly the secret convention of October 1904, led France to ack
nowledge Spain's freedom of action in the region between longi
tude
north was defined by a Franco-Spanish Convention of 1912, as
extending "from the Atlantic the border runs up to the Thalweg




26° and latitude 27° 40' north. Again, the south of 26°
followed this line southwards, until reach latitude 27° 40'
nortih."75
As it was in the case with Mauritania, Morocco repeatedly
disavowed all Franco-Spanish arrangements and claimed that the
Western Sahara's area of 102,703 square miles and its 36,000 in
habitants fell under its jurisdiction. But her claims were in
effective as long as Spain continued to administer the area.
The main event leading to the dispute in Western Sahara
the tripartite agreement between Spain, Morocco and Mauri
tania on November 1975, whereby Morocco and Mauritania were to
over the administration of the territory that Spain was
i Anthony Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundary," in
al of Modern African Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1963, p. 318.
75Ibid., p. 319.
57
GREATER MOROCCO AND SPANISH SAHARA




about to relinquish on February 29, 1976.76 While Morocco was
take over the northern portion, the southern part—the Tiris
Jharbia--went to Mauritania.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqueit el
Hamjra and Rio do Oro (Polisario) , a Western Saharan indigenous
liberation movement, reacted very strongly against the parti
tion of the territory. On February 28, 1976, Polisario crossed
the Rubicon and declared independence. It proclaimed:
In the name and with the help of almighty God and fol
lowing the wish of the Arab people, in faithful memory
of our glorious martyrs and to crown our immense sacri
fice, the flag of the Sahraoui Democratic Arab Republic-,-,
flies over the soil of Saquiet el Hamra and Wadi Dahab.77
Three days later, Burundi and Madagascar accorded recog
nition to the new state. Mozambique, Togo, Algeria Benin,
Guinea and Vietnam did so shortly.
In order to effectively combat the Polisario, in 1977,
Morocco and Mauritania signed a mutual assistance pact. This
led :o the creation of a Supreme Defense Council which brought
the armies of the two countries under a unified command to fight
the Polisario forces. Under this arrangement, by 1978, 12,000
Moroccan troops were introduced into Mauritanian territory.
Part
the 0
were stationed along the border with Western Sahara and the
others inside the occupied territory of Tiris El Gharbia itself.
Intensive fighting between the combined forces of Morocco
78
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Mauritania against Polisario has been ravaging the area
alm<j>st unabated.
The OAU Initiatives to intervene in the conflict started
as fjar back as 1975 when the Liberation Committee met at Moputo-
Mozambique in January 1975. During the debate on Western Sahara,
the delegates from Morocco and Mauritania argued for their terri
torial rights over the former protectorate of Spanish Sahara,
stressing that the right to self-determination was inapplicable
in tie dispute territory. But algeria speaking for the Poli
sario, retorted and maintained that the territory was a colony
of Si>ain and therefore, should be decolonized as any other col
ony. The Committee agreed with Algeria and recommended that
Polisiario be recognized as an authentic liberation movement.
Later on, even the U.N. supported Algeria's arrangements.79
It was during the Port Louis-Mauritius Summit in June
1977, however, that the Polisario was fully recognized. The
Summit passed a resolution giving "unconditional support to the
just struggle of the Saharan people for the recovery of their
natioial rights" and demanded:
. . . immediate withdrawal of all foreign occupation
forces, and respect for the territorial integrity of
t.ie Western Sahara and the National sovereightv of
the Saharan people.80 J
However, the first substantial diplomatic win for the
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Monrovia. The Polisaric issue was placed on the agenda and
discussed thoroughly, even though King Hassan stayed at home and
his foreign minister walked out of the session. The resolution
tha-: was put to vote resulted to a major victory for the Poli-
sar:.o. Thirty-three states, including Mauritania voted for the
rights of self-determination of the Sahraoui people.
The pattern of the voting is interesting; it indicates
a curious situation in the OAU Zaire and Comoros voted against.
Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Central African Empire, the Gambia,
Sierra Leone and Tunisia abstained; Gabon, Morocco, Mauritius,
Senegal, Swaziland, and Chad did not take part in the vote.
A "yes" vote by Mauritania, a former enemy of the Poli-
sario Front, indicated what was to follow later. She was fed up
with the war and was about to pull out, leaving Morocco alone to
struggle with Polisario. The "no" vote by Comoros and Zaire
surprised no one. The unpopular government of the Comoros Is
lands was brought to power by a group of French mercenaries.
The French advisers and security men of Comoros presi
dent, bearing in mind that the holding of Frenchmen hostage by
the I'olisario.. had caused an uproar in France, could not have
advised the Comoros delegate to vote yes. As for Zaire, Presi
dent
King
Mobutu, has since the Shaba incidences, been indebted to
Hassan. It was the king who sent both transport planes and
military aid to Zaire to help expel the rebels in Shaba province.
It is hard to understand why Djibouti sat on the fence
during the voting. She had faced the problem Polisario was
facink. But if it is remembered that French forces are still
whi
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protecting Djibouti's internal security, it could be safely
assumed that French connections were behind the silence.
Egypt and Tunisia did not want to take sides on an issue
fch concerned other members of the Arab League. Algeria and
Morocco had major roles to play in the politics of Northern
Afri.ca, so Egypt and Tunisia did not vote.81
The OAU resolution favoring Polisario's right to self-
determination was reinforced in November 1979 by the United
Nation's Committee on Decolonization where, by a vote of eighty-
three in favour, five against, the forty-three abstention,
approved a resolution re-affirming the inalienable right of the
people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence.82
The OAU's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to
the iispute in Western Sahara was started during the Monrovia
Conference. There, a Committee of Wise Men was mandated to find
a solution to the conflict in the troubled region. Members of
the Committee were drawn from Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Sudan and
Tanzania. Shortly after the Monrovia Summit, acting on his
capacity as co-chairman of the OAU. Subcommittee on Western
Sahara, accompanied by Mr. Edem Kodjo, OAU Secretary General, and
togetiier with President Traore of Mali, General Obasanjo paid a
visit to Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria. In Algeria, they met
with jhe representatives of the Sahraouwi Arab Democratic Repub
lic, in Morocco, King Hassan did not appear to be very adamant;
Africa - See also
New Africa (December 1979), no. 148, p. 16.
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General Obsanajo was fairly optimistic that the dispute
83
discussions with Mauritanian officials also appeared to be cor-
dia"
coulld be resolved peacefully.
Peace efforts have not been limited to African states
only. The regime of Lt. Colonel Salek of Niger which overthrew
President Mokhtar Ould Daddah, on July 10, 1979, wanted a quick
solution to the border conflict. Colonel Salek's regime opened
talks with President Giscard d'Estaine of France. On August 1,
1979, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania delegates had rounds of talks
with the French government. France indicated that it would study
the vaious views including the proposals for a referendum in the
Maurj.tanian part of the occupied territory.84
Spain too has been contacted. For example, when General
Obassnjo and his group were visiting the Maghreb leaders, the
Mauritanian Prime Minister, Col. Bouceif, alto left for Madrid
and Paris. In Madrid he had serious talks with Mr. Adolfo
Suarez, the Spanish Prime Minister, who on a recent visit to
Algeria had advocated the right of self-determination to the
Polisario. But this mission did not accomplish much.85
Faced with other internal problems, such as a weak
economy caused by the war, fear of "blacks right to self-deter
mination in Southern Mauritania" which is encouraged and favored
p. 9564.
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by tj:he president of Senegal, on August 5, 1979, Mauritania
peace with the Polisario and withdrew from the war. Shemade
alsc
tor1
formally agreed to renounce her claims on part of the terri-
she occupied, saying: Nouackchott has decided to withdraw
,,b7
completely from the unjust war of the Western Sahara.
King Hassan has determined and has promised never to let
.ts Sahara.
,,88 So, the struggle in this devil's anvil of
rock, sand and thorn trees continues. As it was the case in the
previous disputes, all the OAU has been able to do is to discuss,
pass resolutions, appoint ad hoc committees and sit back.
Big powers politics have greatly helped to worsen the
situation. Morocco's dream of occupying Western Sahara has been
strengthened by arms from the United States. As Robert Manning
89
reports:
he Carter administration's recent move to supply Morocco's
ing Hassan with sophisticated anti-guerilla weapons ...
as added fuel to the increasingly explosive conflict over
the Western Sahara.90
The United States Assistant Secretary of State, Harold Saunders,
in justifying U.S. military aid to Morocco, was merely voicing
his country's official views when he said:
6Africa Diary, October 8-14, 1979, vol.XIX, no. 44, p.
9714. President Senghor of Senegal lashed Mauritania as 'White'
Berbe:: racialism in the Maghreb toward black population of












Morocco is no longer fighting only to pacify a region it
has annexed. It is also defending itself within its own
territory against external attack.^l
use of American 105mm howitzers, 12.5mm guns, OV-10 armed
reconnaisance planes, Vietnam-tested Cobra helicopters, F-5
jets and other sophisticated weapons supplied by the U.S. will
certainly be used against the Polisario who are also armed with
92
Sovi|et weapons.
To make the situation even worse, President Anwar Sadat
of Ekypt, has recently made it clear that he will supply mili
tary assistance to King Hassan if asked to.
93
Should this happen, there will be further division in
the OAU. Obviously Egypt will be supported by Gabo, Zaire,




African Diary, Novemger 5-11, vol. XIX, no. 45,
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CHAPTER III
THE SETTLEMENT OF SECESSIONIST AND SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES DISPUTES
Ever since the OAU came into being, it has never lacked
problems to solve, or more appropriately, to attempt to solve.
As in was previously observed, though the OAU did not completely
settle the disputes it obviously defused some of the crises. The
real
main
tests of the Organization of African Unity came during the
Nigeria Biafra War and reached its peak during the invasion of
Uganc'a by Tanzania. Because they touched the roots of the three
principles of the OAU, these two problems almost wrecked
the OAU. The principles infringed are: (1) The principles of
noninterference in the internal affairs of states (Article Three,
Paragraph Two). Nigeria and Sudan constantly referred to this
principle when dealing with the rebels in their attempts to break
away. On the other hand, the Osagyefo Nkrumah and Mwalimu
Nyere::e failed to pay much attention to it, (2) respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its
inalienable right to independent existence (Article Three, Para
graph Three). Both the Biafrans and Anya-Nyas, like the Somalis,
unsuccessfully tried to legitimize their peoples' right to self
government. Above any other causes, between 1965 and 1979, the




overall aim of this chapter is to examine how the OAU
hancled these delicate crises; and in particular to see how Dr.
Nkrtmah and President Nyerere made things extremely difficult
for the Organization they helped to found.
The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis, 1967-1970
No attempt will be made to give a full background to
this dispute, but a summary of events leading to the breakout
of hostilities will be listed in a brief chronological order.
January 15, 1966: The Military Coup d1 etat. The Federal
Prime Minister of the Republic of Nigeria, Sir. Abu-
baker Tafawa Balewa and two regional premiers were
murdered. Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Isonsi,
an Ibo, in January 16, assumed the post of Supreme
Commander of armed forces and took control of the
Nigerian government.
July 29, 1966: An anti-Ibo mutiny occurred. General
Ironsi was killed and was succeeded by Lieutenant
Colonel Yakubo Gowon, a Northerner. Lieutenant
Colonel Ojukwu, an Ibo, refused to recognise the
legitimacy of Gowon's action.
September 28, 1966: To revenge the deaths of Sir Abu-
baker, a bloody pogrom took place against the Ibos
living on Northern Nigeria. Thousands of them were
massacred with their properties destroyed or confis
cated. Those who survived fled to Eastern Nigeria, a
region they recognised as their homeland.
jctober 24, 1966: Colonel Odumwegu Ojukwu, Military
Governor of the Eastern Region refused to attend
the Constitutional Committee scheduled to take place
in Lagos.
anuary 4-5, 1967: Members of the Supreme Military
Council of Nigeria, attended by all military gover
nors met at a neutral place, Aburi, in Ghana. The
final agreement reached on the existing political
The chronology of events is based on Peter Schwab, ed.
Biafrla, pp. 1-7, and Yassin El-Ayouty, ed. , The Organization of
African Unity After Ten Years, pp. 152-155.
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and military institutions of Nigeria was ambiguous.
Later on both Colonels Ojukwu and Gowon interpreted
it differently. Because of the dichotomous views
of the Aburi agreement, Ojukwu made it known that
he would boycott any further similar meetings until
an acceptable definition of the Aburi declaration
was made. But, Gowon warned that Ojukwu's stand was
a menance to internal peace.
March 17, 1967: The Constitution Suspension and Modifica
tion Decree (Decree No. 8) was promulgated. It made
military governors autonomous in their regions, but
with the exception of the right to promulgate emer
gency laws which were reserved to the Head of the
Federal Military Government. Colonel Ojukwu attacked
the decree, calling it an obrogation of the Aburi
accord.
March 31, 1967: Colonel Ojukwu ordered all tax revenues
paid in the Eastern Region to be paid directly to
the Regional government. Colonel Gowon regarded this
action as illegal and unconstitutional and acted
swiftly.
April 4-5 and 11, 1967: Nigerian Airways stopped flights
to the Eastern Region. This led Colonel Ojukwu to
call upon all Easterners living outside the region
to return home. The situation deteriorated further
when Gowon also screwed the economic knots by asking
the Central Bank in Lagos to block the transfer of
foreign currency to Eastern Region; and finally,
economic blockade was imposed on Eastern Region.
toy 27, 1967: The barometer of war fever was rising
dangerously. Colonel Gowon, with a new rank of
Major-General assumed full powers as Commander in
Chief of all armed forces and became Head of the
Federal Military Government. He declared a state
of emergency throughout the country and put the army
at alert.
lay 30, 1967: The Eastern Region seceded from Nigeria.
The Republic of Biafra was born. The writer remem
bered that bright morning when the Biafra leader,
over Radio Biafra, Enugu, gave a marathon emotional
declaration of independence speech. Even in Cameroon,
among the Nigerian population, the atmosphere was
equally tense. The Ibos rejoiced as Colonel Okukwu
blasted Gowon over the air of Radio Biafra. But
hatred by other Nigerians against the Ibos could
easily be read on their faces. For his part, Major-
General Gowon quickened the general mobilization and
promised to crush Ojukwu's rebellion. He sternly
68
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warned all nations to keep clear of the internal
affairs of Nigeria and to respect its territorial
integrity.
July 6, 1967: Fighting between the Nigerian Federal
Army and that of Biafra started. The civil war
was on. Notwithstanding Major-General Gowon's warn
ing that no party should interfere in the civil war,
a couple of motives necessitated the OAU's interven
tions in the long run.2
The first reason for the OAU intervention was that the
war iras fast becoming an international confrontation, especially
amon the big powers. The Federal Military Government was fur
nished with huge amounts of arms, including aircrafts and heavy
artillery by Britain, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Egypt




lie of South Africa, France, Portugal and Israel, supplied
to Biafra.
Secondly, four African states accorded recognition to
the rjebels, so, Biafra had in a way gained status of a number
international community.
Thirdly, the economic blockade of Biafra and the devas
tating war caused massive starvation and sickness in Biafra;
world-wide campaigns to save the children in the breakaway
state was launched by charitable organizations. The Organiza
tion of African Unity could not avoid intervening.
Lastly, but far from being the least, another reason
which impelled the OAU's action was the presence of foreign
military observers whose purpose was to investigate genocide
venka,
Peter
summary of these motives is based on Zdenek Cer-
The O.A.U. and Its Charter, pp. 193-194. See also
Schwab, Biafra, p. T~.
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changes made by Biafra. The presence of these observers, it
could be argued, had in all practical purposes turned the crises
from an internal affair to one that called for the world's atten
tion. James Mayall rightly contends that the "scale of suffering
and foreign interventions necessitated the right of the OAU to
•a
interest itself in the outcome of the conflict.1
When fighting between the Nigerian and Biafra armies
erupted on June 6, 1967, it was not until two months later that
the OAU considered it necessary to intervene in the crisis. The
reasons for the delay are not far fetched. Some OAU members,
remembering the hard times faced by the organization in solving
the previous political disuptes, were in no hurry to rush into
this
that
one. Some countries took seriously General Gowon's warning
the crisis was a purely domestic affair of Nigeria. Again
in keeping with, the OAU principle of noninterference in the in
ternal affairs of another state, the OAU members felt it was
better to wait and watch the development.
The first real peace talks were started by the head of
the Roman Catholic church, the Pope. A great majority of the
Christians in Biafra were Roman Catholics, so the Vatican lost
no tine intervening on behalf of its followers. On December 22nd,
Pope Paul VI, sent two emissaries to Lagos. The papal envoys,
Msgrs. Dominic Conway of Ireland and Georges Rocheau of France,
on December 23, 1967 presented the Pope's peace proposals to




al Gowon. Later, the emissaries also held talks with
el Ojukwu in Umuahia, Biafra, on February 9, 1968. In the
ime, the Nigerian Transport Minister, Mr. Joseph Tarka also
ed Pope Paul VI and on February 2, presented to General
, additional peace messages from the Vatican. There was no
through in these negotiations as the Biafrans stood firm
eir desire to be independent. Gowon could not listen to
roposal which would not "keep Nigerians one."
The first OAU initiative in tackling the crisis was
during the Kinshasa summit in 1967. Though the Council of
ters which preceded the Assembly of Heads of State and
did not place the issue on the OAU agenda, the Afri-
eaders could not overlook the situation. Dr. Nnamdi Azi-
the former symbolic Nigerian President, who had joined the
an course, led the Biafran delegation. In vain, he tried
plain the Biafran course in order to win the sympathy and
standing of the African leaders.
The Assembly, at the end of deliberations adopted a
ully drafted resolution which avoided creating the impres-
that the OAU was interfering in the internal affairs of
As a matter of fact, the resolution was a clear vic-




















Assembly condemning every act of sucession in any
smber state, recognizing that this is an internal
4.
See Peter Schwab, Biafra (New York: A Facts on File
Publication, 1977), p. 29. Aee also Woronoff, Organizing
African Unity, p. 490.
5Zdenek Cervenka, The O.A.U. and Its Charter, p. 195
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matter to be solved by the Nigerians themselves, and
re-affirming its faith and confidence in the federal
government of Nigeria ... resolves to send to the head
of the federal government of Nigeria a Consultative
Mission consisting of six heads of state in order to
assure him of the Assembly's desire to safeguard the
territorial integrity, unity, and peace of Nigeria.6
The Consultative Mission, which later became known as the Con
sultative Committee composed of leaders of Cameroon, Congo,
Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and Niger.
The choice of the Committee members was carefully con
sidered. Apart from being its Eastern next door neighbor,
Cameroon, especially the Southwest and Northwestern provinces,
had large number of Ibo businessmen who controlled a good por
tion of trade in Cameroon. Again, the Muslim population in
Northern Cameroon is closely related to that of Northern Ni
geria. Above all, the Cameroonian President Ahidjo is a mod-
rate who is highly respected in Africa. As for Niger, its
conomic interests were at stake in the Nigerian crisis. Being
land locked country, Niger depended on Nigerian Railways for
ransporting its products to the sea and also for its imports
::rom overseas. Its population too, like that of Northern Came
roon shares the same religion with Northern Nigeria. Emperor
Haile Selassie, the ever present peacemaker in African politi
cal disputes, and President Tubman of Liberia, were highly
rated elderstatesmen, as well as pillars of the OAU. The choice
pi General Joseph Ankra to serve on the Committee came as a
Ibid., p. 196. See also Peter Schwab, Biafra, p. 26.
See also Yassin El-Ayouty, The O.A.U. After Ten Years, p. 156.
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re suit of the respect he commanded to both General Gowon and
the Biafran leader. It was General Ankra who arranged the
Aburi meeting in January 1967. His presence, it was hoped
could have positive reaction by the belligerents. Lastly,
Congo-Kinshasa was chosen to serve on the committee most prob
ably because it had gone through the fire of a civil war, and
a similar crisis during Tshombe's Katanga secessionist attempts,
The composition of the committee without any shade of doubt
was a balanced one that was capable of untying the intricate
and slippery diplomatic knots.
Instead of going to Lagos immediately the Committee
waited for six weeks, and when it finally convened on Novem-
be:r 23, 1967 it was told by General Gowon that the Nigerian
cr:.sis was "a purely domestic affair, and in accordance with
th(t OAU resolution, your mission is not here to mediate." Of
course, the Committee agreed and at the end of its visit, it
issued the following Comminique:
The O.A.U. Consultative Mission ... held consultations
with Major-General Yakubo Gowon, Head of the Federal
Military Government of Nigeria yesterday, pursuant to
the resolution on the Nigerian situation adopted at
the fourth session of the O.A.U. Summit Conference in
Kinshasa on September 16, 1967. The Mission reaffirmed
the decision of the O.A.U. Summit embodied in its reso
lution condemning all secessionist attempts in Nigeria.
The Mission also reaffirmed that any solution of the
Nigerian crisis must be on the context of reserving the
unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria .... The
O.A.U. Consultative Mission agreed that, as a basis for
a return to peace and normal conditions in Nigeria, the
secessionists should renounce secession and accept the
present administrative structure of the Federal Military
Zdenek Cervenka, The O.A.U. and Its Charter, p. 197.
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Government's terms for the cessation of military opera
tion. The O.A.U. Consultative Mission agree that ....
The Secessionist should renounce secession and accept
the administraitve set up of the Federation of Nigeria
....8
Certainly the communique's framers bore in mind Article Three,
paragraphs two and three of the OAU Charter, but by failing to
consider Biafra's side of the dispute, the Mission was over
looking the communique's impact on paragraph four of the above
mentioned article. In order to settle a dispute peacefully the
peacemaker must be able to deal with all the parties concerned
in
ta
a manner that one party should not be placed at a disadvan-
;ed position. In other words, outright comdemnation of one
party only hardens its resolve to be adamant, thereby making
peaceful settlements extremely difficult, if not impossible. On
the other side of the coin, as Mayall also points out, the Afri
can leaders would not have done otherwise. Secession is a very
I q
serious political threat to most African states. It must be
strongly resisted, attacked and condemned where and when it
tries to occur. As the official broadcast by Radio Biafra,
Enugu rightly commented, some OAU members, in siding with Ni
geria's position, acted with the knowledge that their own coun
tries may also be faced with a similar situation if they fa
vor ?d Biafra's course. Mr. Mayall said the same thing when
8Ibid., p. 198.
"james Mayall, "The African Unity and the O.A.U.: The
Plate of Political Myth on African Diplomacy," in The Year Book
of World Affairs, 1973, p. 130.
10Zdeneck Cervenka, in El-Ayouty, ed., The O.A.U. After
Ten |Years, p. 157.
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contended that "the fear that by conceding the demands of
group for self-determination would open a Pandora's box
disgruntled minorities elsewhere ....Ifl1
For siding with Nigeria, Biafra condemned the partiality
the African organization. The war was still on, ravaging and
destroying not only the soldiers in the battle fronts, but the
civilians. In any case, considering its hostile atti-
towards its course the Biafrans were willing to accept
tier mediations, outside the OAU; hence it accepted the media-
offered by the British Commonwealth Secretariat.
The Kampala Peace Talks, May 1968
After the usual preliminary behind the scenes diplo
matic formalities, the Biafran delegation led by Sir Louis
Mbafeno and that of Nigeria headed by the hard liner Chief
Em:horo convened in Kampala, Uganda. The conference opened on
23, 1968.
President Milton Obote of Uganda opened the talks and











t at the commencement of the talks indicated an evil omen
the Kampala talks. Mr. Johnson Banjo, a member of the
erian delegation disappeared and was never seen or heard of
In. When tempers cooled after the uproar caused by Banjo's
disappearance the talks started. Nigeria and Biafra could not
agrue on the main issue-secession. Each stood firmly on its
11
James Mayall, The Year Book of World Affairs. 1973,
76
demand; a compromise on even a cease-fire was impossible to
reach. On May 31, Sir Louis Mbafeno declared that:
The Biafran delegation does not see that any useful
purpose can be served in Kampala while more lives
are daily lost in this gruesome war, and Biafran
delegation is going home.i^
Ank it went home.
The gruesome war continued and before long, started to
tuim adversely against the Biafrans. Though he had promised
to ignore the OAU, the appalling conditions of the Biafran
population forced Colonel Ojukwu to accept another OAU media
tion offer.
The Niamey Talks, July 15-19, 1968
African leaders could not stay aloof and watch indif
ferently the war doily taking countless lives. So, Emperor
Haile Selassie revived the work of the OAU Consultative Commit
tee on Nigeria. The Committee met on July 15 in Niamey and in
vited both General Gowon and Colonel Ojukwu; both accepted the
invitation. Points to be discussed were "relief supplies for
the needy and a permanent settlement of the crisis.
,,13
General Gowon first addressed the Committee. He re
jected a cease-fire agreement, arguing that it would only make
it easier and possible for the Biafrans to rearm themselves and
have a breathing space. A cease-fire was possible, he said only
12
Zdenek Cervenka, The O.A.U. and Its Charter, p. 203.
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 419.
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if the rebels renounced their secession. Regarding the relief
supply issue, General Gowon agreed to the creation of 'mercy
corridor1 to enable charitable organizations to distribute re-
li sf supplies to the war affected victims in Biafra.
Colonel Ojukwu for his part, on July 19, demanded a
cease-fire, troop withdrawal and an end to the blockade. In
view of the fact that both parties held their grounds and stuck
to their original demand, no tangible achievements were made
be::ore the meeting ended on July 26. However, it was agreed
that peace negotiations should be continued in Addis Ababa, on
August 5, 1968.
The Addis Ababa Peace Negotiations
August-September 196"6~
of
The delegations sent by the disputants made the outcome
the negotiations a foregone conclusion. The hard liners
representing Biafra and Nigeria were like bringing together a
hungry lion and tiger to peacefully settle a dispute concerning
the sharing of the carcas of a deer.
General Gowon did not even bother to attend; he decided
to send not the diplomatic Chief Awolowo but the inflexible
Chief Enahoro. On the part of Biafra, instead of Sir Louis
Mbateno, Colonel Ojukwu himself led the delegation. Nigeria
waned that the conference was the last chance of peace. In
presenting his case, Chief Enahoro intimated that the settle-
men: was to be based on the territorial integrity and security



















Nigeria, as was the consent of the Niamey plan. This implied
t the talks were to aim at bringing the former Eastern Ni-
ia back into the federation. Chief Enahoro's point of view
unacceptable to Biafra. In his two and half hours marathon
ech, Colonel Ojukwu said just the opposite of what the Ni-
ian delegate had stressed. The Biafran leader's speech was
entially a review of his "country's" course of action. Start-
from the reasons for Biafra's secession he went into great
ail and described the atrocities committed against his people.
massacres in the North, the genocide by the Nigerian armed
ces during the war; he denounced the Federal Military Govern-
t army as well as its supporters. He even alleged that Gen-
1 Ironsi was murdered by General Gowon. The conclusion of
speech indicated the Biafran's unyielding stand:
Our survival cannot be separated from the sovereign
independence of our state. No one who has studied,
the past contribution of our people to the cause of
African freedom and unity can doubt our awareness
of the need for the whole of Africa to unite. Never
theless, we have learnt by bitter experience that
unity must come in stages through cooperation and
mutual understanding .... In fulfillment of that
purpose we offer to discuss with Nigeria the closest
form of association which does not detract us frj
our right to ensure security at home and abroad.
Colonel Ojukwu's speech so stung Chief Enahoro that the
ter in very strong terms denounced it, and refused to see
Biafran leader. Leaving behind Dr. Eni Njoka to lead the
fran contingent in the already fouled atmosphere, Ojukwu
Peter Schwab, Biafra, pp. 63-64. See also Woronoff,
anizing African Unity, p. 422. See also Zdenek Cervenka,






















home. Though the talks continued, it was only too
that no concrete agreement could be reached. On Aug-
7, the Nigerian delegation put forward a nine point plan,
among others included the disarming of the Biafran forces,
ice control of the breakaway region and a promise of not
in troops into Biafra. The Biafrans not only rejected
Nigerian proposal but tabled their seven point peace plan
for an independent Biafra with close economic ties to
16
cease-fire, and so on.xu As gasoline and water cannot
, so too was it impossible, despite every effort by the Em-
or, to get Nigeria and Biafra to see eye to eye. Despite
set backs on disagreements over the main issue of ending




The Algiers OAU Summit, September 1968
When the Heads of State and Government landed in Al-
for their yearly gathering, it was clear that the Ni-
crisis would be the hot issue. And so it was. The
of the four states that had recognised Biafra17 showed
President Nyerere and his three other colleagues had to
their motives for according diplomatic recognition to
breakaway state. To ward off accusations that by recog-
Biafra, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast were
16Peter Schwab, Biafra, p. 16.




sowing seeds of discord and impeding African Unity, President
Nyerere and Houphouet Biogny made it abundantly clear that the
recognition of Biafra posed no danger to African Unity. Ny
erere philosophically argued that:
Unity can only be based on general consent of the Deonle
Union"Vis "thT1?e Pe°Ple mUSt Gel th?t this state. oSSil
to
S3 t?*S?p2^?T ^/^iby refusing to recognise that existence of Biafra we
EaS.S'r 7 suPP°rting a war against the people of
Eastern Nigena~and a war conducted in the name of Unity.18
President Houphouet-Biogny, maintaining views similar
those of Nyerere had earlier explained why he recognised
Biafra by saying:
tl i?Jthe fruit of the common will to live together
should not be imposed by force by one group upon
another If we are all in agreement in the 0 A U in
recognising the imperious necessity of Unity Unity as
the>ideal framework for the full development'of the
^!^ ^ alS° admit that ±Z Sh°uld not become
President Nyerere and Houphouet-Boigny's thesis that
unification could be possible through separation, and free will
of the people ignores practical political history. History does
not: give many important examples of a union which came about as
a Jesuit of the various peoples in the domain agreeing to unite





7!qs Express (Brussels), vol. 8, no. 161, May 25
p. 7 Houphouet-Biogny speech on why he recognised Biafra.'
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force was employed in order to bring about unification. For
e2:ample, Germany was unified by the Iron Chancellor, Von Otto
B^smarch by blood and iron, in 1870, not by separatist policies
by annexing or incorporating the hundreds of German inde-
20
pejndent states. From the small Muscovia state in the thir
teenth and fourteenth centuries, through annexation, subjugation
and conquest the Soviet Union has grown to its present gargan
tuan size. So, the unification through separation thesis could
be demolished without much ado.
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting
atI the Clud des Pins Algiers were unsympathetic to Biafra's in
dependence course. To make matters worse for the "Ibo's coun
try," the United Nations Secretary-General, U. Thant, who also
21
addressed the OAU Summit sided African leaders. The resolu
tion adopted by the Assembly on September 15, urged the OAU and
U.ll. members to "refrain from only action detrimental to the
pe;
22
ce, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria ...," in
keeping with the Kinshasa resolution.
The imminent defeat of Biafra did not deter her on Sep
tember 17, from attacking virorously the OAU resolution. Radio
Bialfra declared that:
We want the O.A.U. to know ... no force can stifle
Biafra's aspiration to be sovereign and free ....
of
20
Shepard B. Clough, Nina Garsonian and Co., A History
:he Western World (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1964), p. 1043
21E1-Ayouty, The O.A.U. After Ten Years, p. 172.












The O.A.U. must live up to its responsibility and
prevent itself from being misled by individuals who
know to confuse religious and racial fanaticism with
African nationalism.23
The war continued with no change in either Nigerian or
fran view points. The last OAU Consultative Committee meet-
in Monrovia in April 1969 failed to break throug the dead-
k. The OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa in September
9 produced no solution either. In its resolution on the
sis, the Assembly simply reiterated what the previous reso-
ions had called for, that is, unity of Nigeria.
24
Biafra's endeavours to let Switzerland, Austria, Sweden
Yugoslavia, instead of the OAU intervene, produced no posi-
e results. The end of 1969 also marked the decline of
fra's will to resist. The moral of the army fell, soldiers
erted, the last strong hold of Biafra, Uli airstrip was
about to fall. These realities compelled the last Biafra Cabi
net meeting on January 10, 1970. After appointing General
Philip Effiong to act for him General Ojukwu said he was leav
ing Biafra in "search of peace." In actual fact, Ojukwu had
seen that the rebellion was over. The Biafran Council of War
had on the same day rejected the hope of a guerilla confronta-
25
tioi, so Ojukwu, fearing capture, sought to escape to Ivory
st. Incidentally, he was the last Biafran officer to use the.
23Peter Schwab, Biafra, p. 72.
24O.A.U. Document AHG/Res. 58 (VI), 1969.
25
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 432.
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only remaining airstrip, for shortly after he took off at 3:00
m., January 11, the Nigerian air force Illyushin-28 bombers
26
piloted by Egyptians, pounded it into rubbles. General
Effiong1 s unconditional surrender on January 12, 1970 was there
fore inevitable. In his surrender statement General Effiong
id he had ordered his forces to disengage and give themselves
to the Nigerian commanders; he called for immediate cease-
re and above all he finally agreed to do what his predecessor




th e basis of the OAU recommendations.
The Nigeria-Biafra crisis was the greatest challenge
thje OAU had faced so far. This challenge, however, had both





flict created a problem among the founding members. The Presi
dents of Zambia and Tanzania, who had been very active in seek
ing a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Horn of Africa and
Maghreb, suddenly became associated with the evil force of
se :essionism which the other African leaders dreaded. On the
positive note, in searching for a peaceful settlement in the
Nigerian Civil War, the OAU stuck to its first resolution made
du::ing the Kinshasa Summit in 1967, namely, the condemnation
1 denounciation of any acts of secession and the recognition
it the crisis was an internal affair of Nigeria. The fact
it only four OAU member states accorded diplomatic recognition
26Ibid. See also Peter Schwab, Biafra, p. 116.
27
Peter Schwab, Biafra, p. 117.
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Biafra was an indication that the majority of African coun
tries stood firmly behind their regional organization. As it
wa^ shown above, even the defiant Biafrans finally acknowledged
authority of the OAU.
In trying to bring about a peaceful end to the crisis
on the basis of an African framework which calls for the exclu
sion of external interference, the OAU endeavours were impeded
by porces outside its control. Britain, Soviet Union, Israel,
South Africa, Egypt, Portugal and many other countries saw the
civil war as a God sent opportunity to market their overstock
piles of weapons of destruction. Added to this was the part
played by foreign soldiers of fortune. The white mercenaries,
for example those from Britain and France fought on both sides
9 R
of nhe war. Such a proliferation of international interven
tion hardly created a diplomatic atmosphere suitable for peace
ful pegotiations.
Many people will agree that the tireless Emperor and
the Consultative Committee did everything possible in their
numerous attempts to resolve this crisis peacefully. If this
conflict is viewed through the lenses of similar political
problems world wide, for example, President Samoza's struggles
with the rebels in Nicaragua, it would be realized that even
the Organization of American States, with the powerful military
muscle of the United States, could not settle the disputes






Treaty Organization too has been unable to bring an end to the
crisis in Northern Ireland. The OAU is plagued by the same
impotent malady which affects other regional organizations, be
they in the Americas or in Europe.
Sudan: The Anya-Nya Secessionist Rebellion
My aim for including the Anya-Nya uprising is to: (1)
Show the intransigence and refute the claims of some OAU mem
bers who said they recognised Biafra mainly on humanitarian
grDunds. If the suffering of a group of people, in this case
s Ibos, could influence the infringement of the OAU Charter,
s blacks of Southern Sudan too would have received the same
attention as the Ibos, (2) Show that while paying much atten
tion to the border disputes in the Horn and Maghreb, as well
as the Nigerian crisis, the OAU grossly failed to alleviate the
sufferings of the Negroes in the South, imposed upon them by
thk Northerners.
For seventeen years, between 1955 and 19 72 the Republic
of Sudan experienced a secessionist rebellion comparable only
to that which engulfed Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. But
uni.ike the Biafran struggle which received much attention, not
oni.y in Africa but the world at large, the Anya-Nya's ordeal
was; ignored. It was ignored in the sense that neither Africa-
states nor other agencies pressured the Khartoum government
injo bringing a quick settlement to a conflict which had
ravaged the South.29
29
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There are conflicting accounts as to what actually
originated the crisis. One version of the genesis of the
confrontation points to the British policy of developing
Southern Sudan separately from the North.3^ According to this
vi€:w, while the North was being developed politically, educa
tionally and economically, the South was neglected. As a re
sult when independence came, the Southerners could not be
fully integrated into the mainstream of national activities.
Others-3-1- dispute the above view and see the cause as a
gradual sequence of events arising from the mistrust and hatred
of i:he Sudanese Muslims dating back to the slavery era when
Egyptians and Northern Sudanese raided Southern Sudan for the
purpose of capturing slaves. The Southern Policy, the British
administrative device whereby the region was governed separately
and differently from the North, according to this view, afforded
the Negroes an opportunity to fully develop their independence
consciousness. If the Southerners had harboured such feelings
against the Northerners, it was logical for them to conclude
that the disturbances of 1955 were merely another indication of
the Northerners malice against them. Secession was, in their
vxew point, the only legitimate solution.
30This is the view of many Northerners. It is elo-
quentily put forward by Mansour Khalid in his article, "The
Southern Sudan and its African Implication," in El-Ayouty, The
O.A.UL After Ten Years, pp. ;94; 175. See also Bershir Mohimed
Omer lentire book, The Sudan: A Background to Conflict.
3101iver Albino and Robert 0. Collins works, A Southern
View Point, and The Sudan in Historical Perspecties, respec-
tiveljr, give good account of this view.
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The incidence of August 19, 1955 at Torit in Equatoria
Province was the immediate cause of the crisis. This unfor
tunate happening occurred when the Sudanese army and police
were ordered to open fire against African labour demonstrators.
But instead of obeying the orders, the soldiers and non-commis
sioned officers of the Equatorial Corps of ;he Sudan Defense
Force mutinied. The rebellion quickly spread to Upper Nile
Province and within a couple of days, pro-Southern army elements
seized control of the South.32
me
su
Though calm was restored through a fairly moderate treat-
it of the rebels, the mutiny was not completely crushed.33 It
rfaced seriously again in 1963 in opposition to the policy of
Isiamisation and Arabization enforced since 1957.34 The South
erners were outraged by the 1958 speech of Ali Abdel Rahman,
th-n Minister of Interior, when he said in Parliament, "The
Sudan is an integral part of the Arab world Anybody dis
senting from this view must quit the country."35 However, it
wa3 not until 1961 when the African resentment against the North
erners reached its peak. While in exile in the Belgian Congo,
in 1961, William Deng, a Dinka, founded the Sudan African
McClintock, "The Southern Sudan Problem
33
34




National Union CSANU) and shortly afterwards another movement
knjwn as Anya-Nya36 came into being. The latter movement,
uncer the leadership fo the self titled Field Marshal Lutuda,
led sixty-four Northerners on November 30, 1963.37 The Cen-
1 government reacted immediately by attacking not only the
rebels strongholds but the civilian population as well. By
February 1964, it was estimated that at least one-third of the
Sudanese army was confronting the two thousand Anya-Nya for
ces 38
Fierce fighting between the Anya-Nya and the Sudanese
regular army was taking place at the same time that the Accra
OAU Summit of 1965 was meeting. Using the OAU Summit as a
venue through which they could inform the African leaders about
what was going on, the Southerners sent a very detailed memo
randum to the African Heads of State and Government. In its
induotory letter the document appealed for urgent intervention
by the OAU, described in detail the cruel sufferings imposed on
the S'egroes and gave a synoptic account of every aspect of the
Negrces life in the Sudan. Surprisingly enough, the Assembly
did not consider the memorandum nor the crisis in Sudan.
The tense atmosphere and the fact that most African
Poisoji.
36
is a name of native concoction of Cobra
38
See New York Times 6:3 (February 28, 1964).
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Jeaders did not attend the Accra Summit probably accounted '
the indifference to the situation in Sudan. Vocal and voci
ferous leaders like Nkrumah and Nyerere who would have under
normal circumstances commented on the Anya-Nya predicaments,
had enough worries already. The Ghanaian leader had only
recently promised not to interfere in the internal problems of
Niger, Ivory Coast and the neighboring Francophone states.
Nyerere could not bring up the matter because he was still
defending his humiliating action when he asked Britain, and not
the OAU member states to send troops to thwart army mutiny which
took place in Tanganyika in 1964.




els. But fear of reprisals dissuaded them from openly sup-
39
ting the Anya-Nya secessionist move. Ethiopia could not
e supported the rebels in Sudan because she was having enough
problems with the Somalis and Eritreans, Congo Kinshasa had
her own trouble in Katanga province and President Jomo Kenyata
and his Kenyan government were busy worrying over the Somali
claims to the Northern Frontiers District of Kenya; Central
Africa Republic and Chad also had too much to think about in
connection to their minority problems. Uganda was unwilling
to oe engaged in a bitter confrontation with Sudan during the
Acc:a Summit. Sudan's Northern neighbours were Arabs and Mus-
limis who were obviously sympathetic to Numeiri and so could
39
~ Peter K. Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan, Parlia
mentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 96.
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Source: Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of
Independent Africa.
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n<|>t raise the issue.
This is not to say that Sudan's neighbours did not in
directly lend support to the Anya-Nyas. Uganda and Congo Kin
shasa did give limited support to the rebels. But Sudan
counteracted by aiding the rebels of those countries. For
example, between 1964 and 1965, the Khartoum government of
Sirr eL Khatim el Khaligan shipped weapons to Christopher Ab-
enye's Congolese Liberation Army.40 The arms shipment only
stepped when it was discovered that the Anya-Nya were inter
cepting some of the weapons and used them against the Sudanese
anjned forces.
Before General Grafar al Numeiri came to power on May 25,
1%9, the Anya-Nyas had specifically asked certain heads of
stc.tes including President Nyerere to intervene.
However, one question needs to be answered. If the four
leaders, including President Nyerere, who recognised Biafra did
so on humanitarian grounds, why could they not have done the
sade to the Southern Sudanese whose fate was very similar to
tha^ of Biafra? The best answer to this question, it seems to
me, is the one given by Professor David Johns. He maintains
tha: Tanzania's decision to recognise Biafra was an error.41
To support the claims that President Nyerere's action was a






■Professor David H. Johns, "The Foreign Policy of
?TnJ£ 5J5 ' &^o The Foreign Policies of African
(London: Hoder and Stoughton, 1977), p. 215.
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Certainly it seemed at variance with ... statements
for African Unity and opposed to secession, as in
the Katanga episode. It was also at odds with the
seemingly irrevocable commitment which Tanganyika and
Zanzibar had made when they merged and which Nyerere
had repeatedly said Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania would
have made if they established a federation. Further
more, Nyerere's 1967 speech on African Unity had been
interpreted as explicitly rejecting any possibility
of recognition of Eastern Nigeria if it seceded.42
Th|e 'humanitarian1 considerations could therefore be discounted.
At any rate, when General Numeiri came to power, he
prDmised to solve the crisis by giving the Southerners the auto
nomous state they had earlier wanted. But, he failed to imple
ment this action until in September after he had regained power
following his overthrow in an abortive coup. The foiled com-
munist coup of January 1971 accelerated peace efforts. If he
had to survive, it was of urgent necessity that President Nu
meiri looked for a quick and lasting solution to the Southern
problem.
So, from May 1971 on, secret negotiations between the
Norjth and the secessionist South started in all earnest. De
spite the war, through the good offices of the World Council of
Churches, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and
Emp eror Haile Selassie, the talks progressed successfully.
44
Theoeace talks culminated in February 1972 with the signing
42Ibid.
^France Mading Deng, African of Two Worlds: The Dinka
in the Afro-Sudan (New York: Yale Press, 1978), p. T5T.
44Edgar O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan 1955-
(London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1977), p. 142. See also
John Howell, "Politics in the Sudan," in African Affairs, vol.
72,
Two
no. 287 (April 1973). See also France M. Deng, African of
Worlds, p. 143. •
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£ the Addis Ababa Peace Accord. The agreement was ratified in
Addis Ababa on March 22, 1972. Among other things the Peace
Accord called for the creation of a single self-governing
region out of the three provinces in the South, High Executive
Council of twelve administrators to govern the region and the
creation of a national army of 12,000, composed of both North
erners and Southerners, to be stationed in the region. The
agreement also stipulated that the national government was to
be in charge of defense, foreign affairs, immigration matters,
foreign trade, currency and other functions vital to the secu
rity of the Democratic Republic of Sudan. The regional govern





The Peace Agreement received mixed responses. On the
pai-t of the Northerners, Major-General Khalid Abbas, the Defense
Mir.ister, Major Zeid, Secretary General of the Sudanese Socia-
the
t Party, and the Chief of Staff of the Sudanese army all
resigned in disgust and protest against the signing of the
agreement which they claimed was a sell out to the rebelling
Southerners. On the Anya-Nya side, Gordon Moyen, leader of the
National Liberation Front living in exile in Zaire denounced
representing only themselves," but Major General Lagu, leader
for
pact as "an Arab fraud agreed to by Southern delegates
45
Ibid. See also Karold S. Nelson, ed., Area Handbook
the Democratic Republic of Sudan (Washington, D. C: U. S.
Government Press, 1973), p. 190.
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of Southern Sudanese Liberation Force (SSLF) was satisfied with




The OAU was too happy to endorse the
48
Subversive Activities Disputes
The cancer of political subversive activities had
existed in Africa even before the foundation of the OAU. Be
tween 1960 and 1965, it was Ghana that was guilty of political
sabotage of other governments. The assassination of. President
SyiLvanus Olympio outside the United States Embassy in Lome
sparked the first major decry of the Osagyefo's subversive
activities.
The OAU first attempt to tackle the problem of politi
cal subversion in Africa took place in Lagos, before the Accra
Summit Conference of 1965. As it would be elaborated later on
in this chapter, not every country was satisfied with Ghana's
pledge to put an end to harbouring subversive elements. So, the
presidents of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey (now Benin),
Nigfer and Togo boycotted the Accra Summit. The 1978 OAU Summit
in Khartoum, Sudan, touched on a delicate point which resulted
to a hullabaloo. The mentioning of the names of leaders impli
cated in subversive activities caused the pandimonium. Presi
dent Mathiew Xerekou took the bull by the horns and openingly
O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan, p. 143.
^Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of
African Unity in 1972," in African Contemporary Record, 1 72-
1973 , vol. 5, p. A47.
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called the Gabonese leader by name and also implicated Morocco
for the January 16, 1977 mercenary invasion of Cottonou, capi
tal of Benin. Finally, 1979 witnessed an unprecedented event
when one OAU member state invaded another, overthrew its legi
timate ruler and replaced him for another of its choice.
My aim in this section is to show hew the OAU was able
tc settle subversive problems caused by two of its founding
members and strong supporters of African Unity.
In order to secure the independence of their countries
thje OAU founding fathers included in the OAU Charter the prin
ciples of noninterference in the internal affairs of states as
well as unreserved condemnation in all its forms of political
suaversive activities on member states, or another state. How-
evsr, these principles have not been strictly adhered to.
Dr. Nkrumah's Subversive Activities
For Dr. Nkrumah, any obstacle standing in the way of
tht formation of an African Union Government was an impediment
to the progress of the continent. The Francophone African
states, by virtues of their close attachments to France were
considered a stumbling block to ending imperialsim and its new
foi-m of neo-colonialism. The best way of getting rid of those
uncooperative leaders, Ghana believed, was to overthrow their
unprogressive governments and have them replaced with those
hes
Sit
ded by men of action. In trying to implement this policy,
Ghsna ran into troubles. The late Prime Minister of Nigeria,
Tafawa Balewa summarized Ghana's indictment as follows:
96
. . . Ghana has become the headquarters of subversives
against African states; that Ghana had established
training camps for subversive elements from African
states; and that Ghana provided very generously every
possible facility to dissident elements from African
states to overthrow the legitimate governments of their
home countries; and finally that opposition elements
from African states were being sent to train abroad and
they were returning to training camps in Ghana to further
their subversive interests.49
Though far off African countries were affected, the immediate
neighbours of Ghana felt the pinch more. For example, Ivory
Ccast, Ghana's Western neighbour had its dissident Sanwi tribes
men trained in Ghana where they plotted to assassinate Hou-
phouet Biogny in September 1963. Upper Volta also felt the
pinch. When the attempts to develop closer cooperation between
Ghana and Upper Volta were foiled in 1961, the strained rela







the Spring of 1963. This eventually led to the takeover of
i disputed territory by Ghana. Ghana's relationship with
er and Togo were more explosive. The latter resulted in the
th of President Sylvanus Olympio while tension in the former
ch started in 1959 reached its crisis stage in 1965, when
sident Hamani Dieri narrowly escaped death.
51
ing
The Kwame Nkrumah's Institute in Winneba was the hatch-
ground and training center for freedom fighters. Here, the
El-Ayouty, The O.A.U. After Ten Years, pp. 24-25.
Woronoff, Organising African Unity, p. 389. See also
William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West
Africa," in Journal of African History, vol. 7, no. 2 (1966),
p. 167.
Woronoff, Organising African Unity, p. 390.
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Chinese, Cubans and other socialist countries trained African
students in guerilla warfare and other sciences of political
CO
sabotage. •>*■
The Osagyefo Dr. Nkrumah was well aware of the ill
feedings against him in person and Ghana in general. So, to
placate Ivory Coast, Niger, Cameroon and any other states on
November 16, 1964, he sent letters to their leaders assuring
them that the refugees creating troubles would leave Ghana.5^
Ghana did not live up to her promise, the trouble
makers still remained in the country. As a sign of protest
and revenge the fourteen nations OCAM Heads of State met in
sion
Abidjan and decided, on May 26, 1965, to boycott the Accra OAU
SummLt which was due in July. Prime minister, Sir. A. T. Balewa
and ihe nominal President Azikiwe of Nigeria intervened to avert
the :hreat of not showing up in Accra. An extraordinary ses-
of the Council of Ministers was convened in Lagos.
The Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Council of
Minis ters which met on June 10-13, 1965 was marked by the
delivery of emotional speeches decrying Ghana's role in
subversive activities. Delegates from the affected French
speaking states testified and exposed Dr. Nkrumah1s covery
activities against their respective states. Ghana's
52Ibid., p. 389. See also El-Ayouty, O.A.U. After
Ten Y^a£s_, p. 27.
53
El-Ayouty, The O.A.U. After Ten Years, p. 26.
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representatives also strongly defended his country's decision
to harbour political refugees.
One political refugee of importance who was the main
ciuse of the conflict between Niger and Ghana, should be men-
tr.oned. Mr. Djibou Bakary was once the Prime Minister of
N:.ger. His opposition against the French referendum of 1958
led to his overthrow. He sought political asylum in Ghana. To
regain power Mr. Djibou Barkary encouraged revolutionary acti
vities in Niger. With his base in Ghana, his commandos raided
several towns in Niger. Ghana argued that the terrorists did
nit necessarily come from Ghana since it was obvious that the
diposed prime minister and supporters in his country of origin.
Furthermore, Ghana's Foreign Minister asserted that:
No country can, on very serious grounds, refuse to
accept people who for one reason or the other dis
agree with their government and therefore decide to
leave their country.55
GJiana refused to admit guilt but agreed to send away the un
desirable refugees who were plotting to overthrow their govern
ments .
The council was satisfied with the compromise and ac
cepted Ghana's invitation to host the OAU Summit in Accra.
To make sure that the venue had adequate security for the
African leaders, the Council of Ministers decided to send the
OAU Secretary-General, Dialle Telli, as well as Mr. Joseph






fiUng mission. Al.o. in order to reassure the fearful Fran
cophone leaders. Dr. Nkrumah flew to Bamake to meet some of
th, OCAM countries leaders who were meeting there. His mission
failed.
To Nkrumah's dismay, when the OAU Summit met. his sump-
tucus and costly state house received only thirteen Heads of
State and Government. In all. of the thirty-six members of the
OAU only twenty-eight showed up. Eight of the OCAM states, Chad
Dahomey, Gabon, Zvory Coast, Malagasy, Niger. Togo and Upper
Voll:a refused to send delegates. 56
The problem of subversion in Africa was included in the
agenda of the OAU Assembly in Accra on October 21-25, 1965
The phenomena of political interference among OAU members, was
not limited to Ghana alone; it was taking place all over African
from the Horn to the Maghreb as well as Southern Africa. After
examining the issue, the Assembly formulated a "Declaration on




The overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah on February 24 1966





THE SUBVERSIVE ARMS OF GHANA UNDER DR. NKRUMAH
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to Ithe war in Vietnam, resulted in a remarkable change in rela
tionship between Ghana and its neighbours. The new Ghanian
government declared that President Nkrumah was responsible for
the past disputes that engulfed Ghana and her neighbours, and
promised to hold talks aimed at restoring good relations. In
1966, the disputes between Niger, Upper Volta, and Ivory Coast
werk setteld;58 the 0AU wag not directly involved ±n the
men|ts.
In conclusion, the role of the OAU insolving the Osa-
gyejfe's subversive activities was to encourage direct talks
between Ghana and the states concerned. This was clearly seen
in the case of the conflict between Upper Volta and Ghana where
dur ng the Cairo OAU Summit, the Heads of State and Government
passed a resolution recommending that Ghana and Upper Volta:
a mutual
ss s
Evej, before Nkrumah was overthrown peace talks had started
between Ghana and Upper Volta; Ghana had promised to withdraw
f^ the disputed territory. Had there not been great pressure
put by the OAU particularly before the Accra conference of
195*. Nkrumah would not have promised curtailing subversive
activities. The end of the Osagyefe's subversive work in 1966




O.A.U. Document, AHG/Res. 19(1), 1964.
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TANZANIAN INVASION OF UGANDA





vities by the Mwalimu Dr. Julius K. Nyerere, the Nkrumah
Africa.Hast
The Mwalimu Dr. Nyerere's Subversive Activities
This section will deal mainly with the Tanzanian-
dan crisis. My aim here is to show that the OAU was in-
ble of curbing subversive activities of President Nyerere,
of the pillars of the Organization of African Unity.
Relations between Tanzania and Uganda took a sharp turn
the worst when General Idi Amin toppled Dr. Obote in a mili-
coup in 1971. The deposed leader was given political
in Tanzania where Dr. Nyerere continued to regard him as
a's head of state. Obote's supporters and rebel exiles in
quickly came together and started launching attacks
ist Uganda from Tanzania. Professor David Johns60 observes
Dr. Nyerere1s personal hatred for Major General Amin, and
farm friendship with Obote were responsible for the tension
en Tanzania and the new regime in Uganda.
The 1971-19 72 crisis between the two East African coun-
received prompt intervention by Somalia in 1972. During
enth anniversary OAU Summit in Addis Ababa, Emperor Haile
sie joined Somalia in reconciling the disputants.6^
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622 crisis, z relationship between the two countries never
iwed remarkable improvement. The rebels continued to regroup
solidify their aims of overthrowing Amin's regime; Obote
o increased his verbal and written attacks on Amin. 63
The tension that had been mounting over the year
ched its boiling point on October 11, 19 78 when the Ugandan
els from Tanzania invaded the Ugandan town of Mbarara, West
Lake Victoria; the same town that was attacked during the
2 invasion. The following day Amin sent an urgent telegram
President Nyerere, saying: "Uganda does not want war or
understanding ..." and urged tanzania to withdraw its
ces.6^ The reply from Tanzania was "There is nothing at all.
never President Amin is in trouble he looks for a scapegoat,
is all nonsense."65 Tanzania kept on denying the invasion
le in actual fact it was going on. Events moved fast. On
ember 1, Ugandan forces retaliated by invading 710 square
es of Tanzanian territory, around the Kagera River.66 Presi-
t Nyerere, on November 2, warned that all parties who were
62lbid.
63For example, during the June 1973 OAU Summit, Obote
: a memorandum which gave details of nmrders and tortures of
c 80,000 Ugandans by Amin. See Zdenek Cervenka, "The Tenth
Lversary of the O.A.U." in African Contemporary Record,
3-1974, p. A-32.





offering mediation should cease their efforts and said that the
only task of Tanzania then was to hit back at President Amin
whon he described as a savage. '
The intensification of hostilities caused General Amin
to telephone President Daniel Moi of Kenya to intervene. The
Kenyan leader, on November 6, replied that the problem should
be solved peacefully under the OAU stipulations. Shortly after-
wares Uganda received representatives of President Numeiri of
Sudan who was the current Chairman of the OAU. The envoy, Mr.
Philip Obang was accompanied by Mr. Peter Anu, the OAU Assis
tant Secretary-General. They were able to persuade the Ugandan
leadsr to commit himself, on November 8, to withdrawal of his
troops in Kagera. While agreeing to do this, President Amin
called on Tanzania to assure him that President Nyerere "will
68
neve: invade Uganda again ... and cease arming Ugandan exiles."
But "anzania's reply was a mobilization of 10,000 tropps to
fighi: the 3,000 troops of Amin. November 12, Tanzania said she
had launched a major counter-offensive to destroy the army of
Amin and to drive him from power. 69
In keeping with his promise of withdrawing his troops
'in tihe interest of peace," on November 14, President Amin lived
up tc his words. He invited both the UN and OAU to send
Redg.
repel
lunatic ex-boxer stricken with syphilis.
67lbid.
68Ibid., p. 9416.
69ibid. ; see also African Recorder (January 1-4, 1979),
No. 12, vol. 17, no. 1, where Tanzania vowed not only to
Amin's invasion but to topple the man she described as a
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observers to confirm his troops evacuation. Diplomats in Kampala,
together with the OAU representatives visited the area and con
firmed the Ugandan troops withdrawal. Still, Tanzania claimed
that) fighting was still going on in the area. Observers who
visited the area found no evidence in Tanzanian claims.
In order to ensure stability and lasting peace between
the two countries, the Nigerian leader, general Obasanjo dis
patched high level envoys to visit President Nyerere to plead
that he should not provoke a renewal of conflict in Uganda. Lt.
General Theophilus Danjuma, the Nigerian Army Chief of Staff who
led the Nigerian peace mission was told by President Nyerere
that "Africa would be setting a dangerous precedent if Amin was








The envoys returned empty handed.
Acting on his capacity as the OAU current Chairman, Presi-
umeiri visited Uganda and Tanzania as well as the states
72
g borders with the warring countries. His peace mission
because Tanzania wanted the OAU first of all to condemn
alleged invasion. Failure by the OAU to do what Tanzania
called it to do, was used as a pretext by both Tanzania and the
Ugandaifi rebels to increase the fighting. Dr. Obote came out





72Africa Report, vol. 24, no. 3 (May-June, 1979), p. 5.
73
African News, vol. 19, no. 1 (January 7, k980),pp. 8-9.
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The crisis between Uganda and Tanzania went on without
mas.ive OAU intervention as was the case during the Nigeria
Bia::ra War. The invasion of Uganda was completed on May 29. when
Arur«. the last major town was captured. When his task was done
President Nyerere claimed that the objective of his country was
"ih M
y was
punish Marshall Idi Amin for the invasion of Tanzania and was
inot aimed at removing him from power."™ To justlfy hl.
the ranzanian leader is quoted to have boasted:
is *" house,:.t down. 75
The part played by Tanzania during its crisis with Uganda
raised great tension during the OAU Summit Conference in Monrovia.
In his farewell address the outgoing OAU Chairman, President
Numeiri of Sudan, whose peace mission had been rebuffed by Tan
zania, and whose country as a result of the invasion, touched the
spark. He called Tanzania action 'regretable,• adding that it
may b.. creating a precedent in Africa. He reminded the open
sessicn of the stipulation laid down in the OAU charter by saying-
President Nyerere promptly responded to the charges, and speaking
frOm the chair defended his action by saying:
112, Kg? 4"17' 1979>'
75Ibid.














We are unfair in the proposition that when one country
has committed an act of aggression against another,
has clearly violated the Charter of the O.A.U., has
blatantly attempted the annexation of a piece of land
of another country, that to appeal to the O.A.U. to
condemn that act of violation of the Charter is in it
self a violation of the Charter.77
ere's defense notwithstanding, the attack on Tanzania con
ed. General Obasanjo termed Tanzania armed intervention
-advised" and went on to inform the session that
. . . verification ... revealed that incursion into
Uganda from Tanzania either by Tanzanian troops or
Ugandan dissidents had occurred first and Ugandan
authorities duly notified the O.A.U. and U.N., without
any reaction from either organization before Uganda
took retaliatory action.78
ondered who the aggressor was; was he the initiator of the
ocation or the one who reacted to it?
The OAU Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Peter Onu who
in January 1979 gone to Tanzania to talk peace with Tan-
an unrelenting authorities, joined the bandwagon of Nyerere's
ics. He read a message from the Ugandan Action Convention
essed to president Tolbert, Chairman of the OAU. The mes-
which was read to the open session read thus:
We of the Ugandan Action Convention ... wish to draw
and to hereby draw urgent attention to President
Nyerere's deceit and treachery of the people of Uganda
and the world in annexing Uganda under the guide of
overthrowing Amin ... .79
Hot words were exchanged no doubt but the OAU Summit





membler of the OAU could not afford to be anti-OAU Charter with
out even a reprimand.
CHAPTER IV
THE OAU AND THE LIBERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
VIEWED THROUGH THE ZIMBABWEAN STPUGGLE
Even before the formation of the OAU, African leaders
strongly urged for the liberation of Southern Africa in general
and South Africa in particular. The defiant oppressive aparthied
white minority settler regime was regarded by African leaders as
an insult and a big challenge for Africans in the continent.
However, in view of the fact that South Africa has been enjoying
the moral and military support of Britain, France, the United
Staties of America and other NATO countries, and above all, since
its tnilitary might is alleged to be superior to that of the
rest
dene
of the African countries combined, for the time being,
apart from sporadic militant uprising such as the Soweto inci-
of 1976, little has been done to challenge it by force. In
any case, in order to ensure its eventual liberation the OAU is
adopting a strategy which aims at first liberating South Africa's
satellites and peripheries, namely, Rhodesia and South West
Africa. When every country in Southern Africa is liberated,
Soutlfi Africa, no matter how powerful, will one day be liberated.
In analysing the role of the OAU in its efforts to lib
erate Southern Africa, I will limit the treatment to the former
colony of Southern Rhodesia, for since 1965, this territory has
110
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recjived the OAU's greatest attention, at least if its libera-
tior. is compared to other places like Angola, Mozambique and
South Africa.
The urgent and paramount necessity of liberating the
African continent has been given top priority by many African
leaders. For leaders like Nkrumah and others the independence
of their counties was incomplete and meaningless until the whole
of Africa was liberated.1 The decolonization of South Africa,
Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola, French Somaliland, Spanish Sahara,
the Comoro Islands, Canary Islands, the Seychelles, Guinea-Bissau
and other dependent territories received much attention during
the hjeroic May 1963 OAU founding Summit Conference. So as to
make
the 0
the liberation of these territories a primary objective,
)ku included in its Charter articles specifically addressing
this Issue. In Article TVo paragraph one (d) one of the OAU's
main aims was to "eradicate all forms of colonialsim from Africa-
while Article Three paragraph six committed OAU members to the
principle of "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of
the African territories which are still dependent."2 The first
OAU Administrative Secretary General, Mr. Diako Telli, best sum





address marking the eighth anniversary of the OAU, he
Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path dd
See O.A.U. Charter Article 2 Paragraphs 1, 3 and 6
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Since it was established, the Organization of African
Unity's prime urgent objective has been the total
liberation of our continent from all forms of foreign
occupation, oppression and exploitation .... Our
ardent desire at the O.A.U. Secretariat is that ... all
African leaders would transcend their differences in the
greater interest of Africa, close their ranks and con
scious of common danger threatening them adopt for our
collective honour, a more dynamic and effective new
strategy for the liberation of our continent from the
last humiliating vestige of colonial occupation and
racial oppression.3
During the first ordinary session of the Assembly of
of H=ads of State and Government in Cairo July 1964, the Decoloni-
4
zation Resolution was passed. This great declaration became the
bulwark and conerstone of the OAU when considering the freedom
of dependent territories. Colonial powers were called upon
to g:.ve up their colonies. This request was specifically made
to Great Britain, for Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal for Mozam
bique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Since it is common knowledge
that independence is never given on a silver plate, the OAU re
solved to give direct moral, military and territorial bases for
nationalist movements waging wars of national liberation.
Other non-military considerations were made. Diplomatic
pressure in the United Nations, non-aligned states conferences,
World Court of Justices, and any other available, effective and
convenient international bodies were considered.
Colin Legum, ed., Africa Contemporary Record.(1971-
1972), p. A-84.
4O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 7(1). See also AHG/Res. 8(1) and
AHG/9IC1) all of 1964, dealing wiht the decolonization of the
various territories.
El-Ayouty, The O.A.U. After Ten Years, p. 135.
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In order to achieve the liberation objectives, the OAU
up a special fund and appealed to member-states to contribute
voluntarily but generously financial and other aids to help the
freedom fighters. It would be more appropriate now for me to
examine specially the efforts to liberate Zimbabwe, which the
white minority settlers called Rhodesia.
The Liberation of Rhodesia
A brief chronology of events will help to elucidate the
Rhodjesian political problem.6
October 30 1888: Cecil Rhodes' representatives tricked
Lobengula, ruler of Ndebele nation into signing of
£3dU2£e m?lng ri?htS' This became knownas fheJ™Jdt£oncession. The agrement stipulated that only
ten white men would enter Ndebele nation for the
mining operation.
«c S ?S and hls agents started to use the agreement
as the basis for promulgating laws and regulations
setting up a force and front to act as a iover^ment
too6lftea repudiated the Rudd Concession, but U was
September 12 1880: The Occupation Day. A pioneer
column of 200 settlers and hundreds of mercenaries
chosen by Cecil Rhodes raised the British flat at
Fort Salisbury in Mashonaland. i3ritlsh tlaS at
October 1893: The massive invasion of Ndebele by Rhodes
TSqa fT .21?? LobenSula ^ed the following year
1894, and with him went the Ndebele nation.
Beforje his death, Chief Lobengula succinctly reported the white
man s treachery used to subdue him. He said:
Did you ever see a Camelion catch a fly? The Came-










sometimes, then he advances very slowly and gently,
first putting forward one leg and then the other.
At last, when within reach, he darts out his tongue
and the fly disapDears. England is the Camelion
and I am the fly.7
October 29, 1922: Rhodesian whites voted for the colony
to be self-governing. The following year, October 1,
1923, the minority settlers adopted their first con
stitution, assuming all political powers alone.
1952: As if the power grasp of Southern Rhodesia was
insufficient, the Rhodesian whites schemed the
formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasa-
land, better known as the Central African Federa
tion. It comprised of Northern and Southern Rho
desia and Nyasaland. Its covert political aim was
to cement the white power in Southern Africa. It
was only after a hard struggle that the federation
was dismantled in 1963.
1961: The adoption of a new constitution. To placate
the disgruntled Africans, the new deceitful device
offered fifteen out of sixty-five seats in the
legislative to blacks.
November 11, 1965: Ian Smith unilaterally declared in
dependence for Southern Rhodesia. This outrageous
action sparked protests not only in Africa, but the
world at large. the U.D.I, became the strongest
rallying point in the liberation of Rhodesia.
The first modern nationalist organization that was highly
in Rhodesian politics was formed in August 1955. The
ern Rhodesian National Youth under the leadership of James
rema and George Nyandoro attacked not only the white minority
e in Southern Rhodesia but the Central African Federation
On September 12, 1957 this movement merged with the
National Congress (ANC) which had existed since 1934,
irough which Rhodesian black elites appealed for justices
well
can
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heir people, to form Southern Rhodesia African National
ess. Joshua Nkomo and James Chikerema became President and
President respectively.
8
With the establishment of the 1961 Constitution which
d to reflect the demands both Africans and the Southern
sian National Congress, Nkomo abandoned the above movement,
ounded on December 9, 1961, a more militant one called,
bwe African People Union (ZAPU). He foresaw a bitter
gle ahead, and in order to prepare for the future violence,
d 1962, he started sending militants abroad for military
ing, mainly to Ghana, Algeria, China, Czechoslovakia and
o
Eastern countries. It was outlawed in September 1962,
ng Nkomo to seek refuge in Tanzania on September 20, where
tended to form a government in exile.
With Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and A. Mukhahlera, he set
executive council in Dar es Salaam. To seek support for
ovement he travelled abroad and addressed the U.N. Fourth
ttee. This resulted in the dispatch of a U.N. sub-committee
odesia to London to consult the British government on
hodesian situation. The U.N. committee found out for it-
that Rhodesia was not a genuine self-governing territory.
He also travelled extensively in Africa lobbying for sup-
He led the ZAPU delegation to Addis Ababa during the May
OAU founding summit. When he requested financial assistance
o




from the OAU he was asked to return to Rhodesia and organize more
effectively African political activities within Rhodesia, The
OAU
and
African Liberation Committee also refused him financial aid
reiterated the earlier position of the OAU, to repeat, to
Ian
go back to Rhodesia and organize the Africans. To Rhodesia he
returned, though it was not long before he was rounded up by the
Smith regime and detained at Gunakudzingwa detention camp
wherp he remained for almost ten years without formal trial for
treason.
The other major movement was Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU), a splinter movement born out of disagreement with
Nkomo's leadership. Sithole, Leopold Takawira, Moton Malianga
and Robert Mugabe who remained in Dar es Salaam when Nkomo re
turned to Rhodesia criticized his leadership and deposed him.
Nkomci in turn suspended them from his organization. In the course
of tt.is internal dispute, Sithole and his followers returned to
Rhodesia and formed ZANU. Sithole, the splinter group leader
gave the purpose of forming his movement, saying:
African politics in Zimbabwe, as well as in European-
ruled Africa, began as 'reformist politics.' But now
we have entered the phase to 'take over' politics to
rule Zimbabwe for the benefit of the voiceless African
majority. We have entered the period of political con
frontation. ZANU represents the fighting spirit which
began with an imposed rule in 1890 and shows the unity
op spirit between those who have gone on and those who
are still living. We have a duty to ourselves and the
unborn generations of Zimbabwe, and that duty is to free




"Ibid., p. 175. He quoted Mwenje-Lusaka, a ZANU
Department of Political Affairs pamphlet, no date.
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The disagreement which resulted in the creation of ZANU con
tinued to separate the two movements. Each opposed the other,
and before 1966, very little was done to confront their common
enemy, namely, Ian Smith and his settler regime.
It was ZANU that launched the first full scale guerilla
warfare. Using its bases in Zambia, on 28-29 of April 1966, the
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) confronted
12
Rhodesian Security forces near Sinoia in Rhodesia. ZANLA
claimed to have inflicted some casualties but Rhodesia denied the
report. Calling it 'irresponsible' Zimbabwe African People Union
denounced the ZANLA attack. However, ZANLA continued to conduct
sporadic attacks on the white settlers' farms, homes and other
areas in Rhodesia.
Attempts by President Kaunda to get the two movements to
close ranks resulted in token unity in the formation of the
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLOZI) in October 1971.
This endeavour, apparently did not suit the majority of ZAPU
and ZANU followers. It appeared as if there were three 'do
nothing' movements--ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI, in the early 1970s.
The OAU Endeavours
Even before the founding OAU and the establishment of
the ALC, Ghana and the United Arab Republic took upon themselves
the responsibilities of aiding freedom fighters from Southern
Africa. Ghana took the lead. In order to coordinate their
12
John Davis and James Baker, Southern Africa in Transi-
(New York: Frederick A Praeger Publisher, 1969), p. 411.
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activities and also to familiarize themselves with the various
guerilla warfare tactics, Ghana called a conference of Freedom
Fighters in Accra, in June 1962. The Ghanian leader asked the
freedom fighters in the various territories to be united, saying:
"You must forget your theoretical differences and minor political
polemics." As it was previously mentioned, the Kwame Nkrumah's
Institute in Winneba trained freedom fighters from Rhodesia and
South Africa. In addition, Ghana created the Bureau of African
Affairs "which aided movements in various countries and even
13
organized conferences of freedom fighters." For his individual
contribution, President Nasser of the United Arabs Republic
(Egypt) founded the African Association which main purpose was
to provide facilities in Cairo to the various revolutionary
groups.
Other pre-OAU attempts to encourage liberation activities
included the holding of the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Confer
ence (AAPSC) in Moshi, Tanganyika, from February 4 to 11, 1965.
This conference strongly recommended:
. . . the formation of a United National Front in any
one country that is not liberated yet and the coordina
tion of action amongst these different national fronts,,,
to make their struggle for independence more effective.
While Nkrumah was even contemplating raising a people's
miliidia to fight in Rhodesia, Ben Bella of Algeria had since 1963
been willing to supply to to 10,000 troops to fight the liberation
p. 15 3.
13





The pre-OAU liberation movements pressured the OAU
founding fathers to create the African Liberation Committee in
May 1963. The ALC was originally made up of nine members,
namely, Algeria, Guinea, U.A.R., Congo Kinshasa (Zaire), Ethiopia,
Nigeria, Senegal, Tanganyika and Uganda. It had its headquarters
in Ddr es Salaam. The ALC was "responsible for harmonizing the
assistance from African states and for managing the Special Fund
to b$ set up for that purpose."
Concerning Rhodesian liberation, the Committee wisely
saw that one of the best ways to pursue the Rhodesian problem was
by letting the African members of the Commonwealth put great dip-
lomatjic pressure on Britian. According to Immanuel Wallerstein,
the objective of using this tactic was to induce the United
Kingdom to convene a constitutional conference which would lead
to ths transfer of power to the Africans. The second tactic
was to encourage ZAPU and ZANU to unite and start effective
struggle inside the country. In order to have the backing of
Northern Rhodesia which was about to attain independence, the ALC
gave Jiinancial support to Kenneth Kaunda's party. It was wisely
calcu
would
ated that if Kaunda was helped to win the elections, he
be sympathetic to the nationalists course in Southern
vol. 5
Osita Eze, "O.A.U. Faces Rhodesia," in African Review,
, no. 1, p. 47.
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sia. The ALC was right. So the initial ALC tactics were to
e the Rhodesian problem on the round table peace conference
11 as on the battle front.
It takes time to develop a consistent program of action,
arly efforts are bound to be less perfect; this was true to
.C. The ALC must have exceeded its limits of action. Ghana,
tful of her exclusion from the nine original members1** was
critical of the way the ALC was functioning. Nkrumah even
eld Ghana's contributions to the ALC because of "the fre-
and persistent reports from Freedom Fighters about the short
; of the aid and facilities for training offered to them.'









ked the ALC for assuming responsibility for over-all stra-
for transferring the primary role in aiding liberation
movements to neighbouring countries, and for establishing an over
20ate secretariat with inadequate security precautions.
r, the 1966 Council of Ministers resolved the controversies
iriding the troubled ALC by deciding that:21
1. The liberation Commiteee's Committee com
petence covers action administration but
not policy making.
2. The OAU Secretariat assumes over-all control
of the committee's activities.
18
Zdenek Cervenka, The O.A.U. and Its Charter, p. 18.
Nkrumah, The Revolutionary Path, p. 280.
20
Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa, the Politics of Unity,
He quoted the Spark (Ghana) issue of October 25, 1963
21
Zdenek Cervenka, The O.A.U. and Its Charter, p. 18.
The
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controversy s concerning the ALC and other disagreements
amorg OAU member states led to the formulation of no concrete
polijcy to counteract Mr. Ian Smith's threat of U.D.I. In any
case, shortly before the U.D.I, the Defense Committee which is
also known as the Committee of Five, comprising of U.A.R., Tan
zania, Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria was formed in October 1965 to
22
follaw up the matters and resolution relating to Rhodesia. In
November 1965 this committee was summoned to study and report on
the
only
J.D.I, issue. No meaningful recommendations were made; it
announced that the OAU Council of Ministers would meet in
Addis Ababa to discuss immediate action. Accordingly, an extra
ordinary session of the Council of Ministers was called in Decem
ber 1.965 to decide how the OAU was to meet Ian Smith's U.D.I,
challenge.
For failing to prevent the U.D.I, on one hand, and for
being unwilling to crush the rebellion by force on the other, the
Council of Minister passed a resolution asking the OAU member
states to sever diplomatic relations with Britian. This was in
accordance with the 1965 OAU Summit resolution whereby the Heads
of State and Government promised to:
. . . reconsider all political, economic and financial
relations between African states and the United King
dom Government in the event of this government's grant-
iig or tolerating Southern Rhpdesian's independence
under a minority government.^3
But only the radical states, namely, Algeria, Congo Brazzaville,
22
Africa Research Bulletin, PSC Series, vol. 2, no. 10,
October 1-31, 1965, p. 378.
23.
Woronoff, Organizing Africa Unity, p. 238.
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implement the resolution to punish Great Britain, President
Nyert


















, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Tanzania and U.A.R. obeyed,
ing scornfully of those African states which failed to
re reproached them by saying: "The O.A.U. decision at Accra
ok at their bank balances. This is ridiculous.
,,24
Within a year, however, including Tanzania, the seven
ries that severed diplomatic relations with Britain, nor-
ed them. They claimed that Britain had reconsidered and had
aimed that "there can be no independence before majority
25
in Rhodesia," a commitment that African states had wanted
an to make.
The 1966 coups were big blows to a united stand against
D.I. The overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah in particular caused a
set back in the liberation struggle. The New Government
teral Joseph Ankra reversed Nkrumah's foreign policy objec-
Emphasis was placed on solving Ghana's domestic problems,
ras clearly noticed during the Council of Ministers Confer-
n Addis Ababa in March 1966 where the seating of Ghana's
gime's representative caused a great commotion. While many
s walked out in protest, Mr. Osmen Ba of Mali, the first
Chairman of the conference resigned in protest of Ghanian
presentative's presence in the meeting. The detention of
mlliam Edgett Smith, We Must Run While They Walk,
p. 28
25




Guinean delegation who happened to stop in Accra on their
to the above conference caused more commotion.
Though Seymour Hersh states that Nkrumah's downfall came
aboikt because the latter "had angered the United States by main-
26
taining close ties to the Soviet Union and China," there is a
strong indication that Nkrumah was silenced because of his stand
on ;he African liberation struggle. In Nkrumah's own words:
. . . relationship between the U.S.A. and Ghana had
reached a new low as a result of Nkrumah's charges
that the United States is foremost among the neo-
colonialist powers seeking to exploit and subjugate
the African continent: What appeared to annoy the
State Department was the timing of the publication
and the fact that copies of the book (Neo-colonialism)
were circulated among African heads of state and the
delegations attending the OAU Summit meeting in Accra
in October 196527
Nkrjumah's book, Neo-Colonialsim, The Last Stage of Imperialsim
alarmed the State Department to a degree that it delivered an
aide memoial protest to the Ghanian government. Part of the pro
test reads: "The government of the United States actually there
fore holds the government of Ghana fully responsible for what
ever consequence the book's publication may have.
,,28
Three
moriths later, Nkrumah was overthrown with the aid of the CIA.
29
^"Seymour Hersh, CIA said to have aided plotters who
overthrew Nkrumah in Ghana. In Ray, Schaap, Meter and Wolfed,
Di^ty Work 2. The CIA in Africa Lyle Stuart in New Jersey, 1979.
27
Nkrumah, The Revolutionary Path, p. 312.
28Ibid., p. 311.
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The point I have tried to establish above is that strong
ic interests in Southern Africa, especially in Rhodesia
uth Africa fought hard to maintain the status quo. If such
ilibrium was to be maintained radicals like Nkrumah who
hard for the liberation of the subjugated territories were
ked for silence.
To return to OAU reaction to the U.D.I., another inhibit-
ctor on the part of the African leaders to act in unani-
also the fact that the Arab states were becoming more
involved in the Middle East deteriorating situation.
Boumedienne had replaced Ben Bella who was very committed
liberation of Southern Africa. So, the crisis in the Mid
as well as the Maghreb diverted attention from Rhodesia
er issues.
But the U.D.I, issue was not completely forgotten. The
Is "Revolutionary Summit" was held in Cairo on April 4-6,
It was attended by Houari Boumedienne, Moktar Ould Daddah,
Nyerere and Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sekou Toure sent his
sntative and Massamba-Debat as well as Modibo Keita pro-
support. The meeting critically examined the Rhodesian
3 and in the end concluded that "the use of force is the
ifective means to end the racist regime in Rhodesia."^
licaly heads of state promised increasing aid to ZANU and
'resident Nasser strongly called for an all out uprising
30
Woronoff, Organizing African Unity, p. 597.
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of tihe Zimbabwe people. As the struggle unfolded, the mod
erates also joined the radicals by stressing that force was the
only way of ending the crisis.
Once more, other crisis in the continent caused a delay
in quick action against Rhodesia. The Nigeria-Biafra crisis
becane the hot issue for a period of almost two and a half years.
France, Israel and Portugal which were directly giving military
aid :o South Africa, and South Africa which was actively involved
in the fighting in Zimbabwe, joined Biafra side. The aim here
was i:o disunite Nigeria which was very anti-Southern African
minority regimes, and also to prolong the war as much as pos
sible so that Ian Smith's regime could have a breathing space.
The above assertions are supported by the rejuvenerated
spirit in the OAU after the Nigerian civil war. The 1971 OAU
Summit was the most vocal since the U.D.I., as far the libera
tion of Rhodesia was the issue in question. The Heads of State
and Government quickly endorsed the Council of Ministers declara
tion which called for increase assistance to the liberation move
ments L Some moderates even went further. For instance, while
Presidents Sengher and Ahidjo called for the doubling of even
trebling contributions, General Gowon suggested setting a time
32
limit for the liberation of the continent. During the same
summit the OAU the Assistance Fund for the Struggle Against
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As if to tell the minority regimes in Southern Africa in
particular and the world in general that it was absolutely ready
to tackle the liberation of Rhodesia, the 1971 Summit authorized
its current chairman to tour the world. Accompanied by the
foreign ministers of Zambia, Kenya, Mali and Cameroon, in addi
tion to Mr. George S. Magombe, the Executive Secretary-General
of the ALC, as well as the OAU Secretary General, Mr. Aiallo
Telli, President Ould Daddah visited a number of Western capitals,
In the United States, the delegation was received by President
Nixor.. President Daddah complained about U.S. support to Portu
gal and South Africa. Supporting these countries, he said, was
not ip the best interest of Africans struggle against colonialism
and oppression. His diplomatic host was uncommitted and made no
positive reply.
In Canada, the prime minister was asked to put greater
press ire on NATO leaders so that that organization's military
facilities and strategic location should not be used as spring
board to subvert Africa. The delegation received no assurance
for itts demand.
It was in the Scandinavian countries that the OAU envoys
found jmuch support and cooperation. The Swedish Prime Minister,
Olaf iJalme agreed to increase his country's material and finan
cial support to the African Liberation Movements. For his part




offered $100,000 to the course of African Liberation.3^
The OAU tour was by all means successful. Since then,
other world bodies, for example the World Council of Churches
followed the Scandinavian lead of giving financial support to
African freedom fighters.
The tension which developed in the OAU as a result of
the Overthrow of Dr. Milton Obote of Uganda notwithstandig, the
liberation of Rhodesia was still a hot issue. In 1973, the ALC
meeting in Accra issued the famous 27 Points Accra Declaration
35
on African Liberation, declaring "the liberation of terri
tories under foreign domination could be achieved only by armed
struggle." The liberation efforts received greater emphasis from
1975 on. The Council of Ministers meeting in Kampala, Uganda,
from k uly 18-25, 1975 called on the people of Zimbabwe to in
crease: their armed conflict, and also appeal to organizations and
countiies friendly to Africa to render more aid to the struggle.
To add more weight to the liberation efforts, the Heads of State
and Government meeting in July in Kampala, appointed the Front-
Line Presidents Committee and made President Nyerere of Tanzania
as president. The summit also authorized the Front Line Presi
dents :o hold diplomatic constitutional talks with the minority
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Therefore, with the full blessing of the Front-Line
Statks and OAU, in August 1975, President Kenneth Kaunda was
to join South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Ian Smith
and the nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Abel Muzerewa
and Ndubaningi Sithole for constitutional talks which were held
on a railway carriage on the bridge across the Victoria Falls.
One may wonder why Mr. John Vorster's presence was tolerated. The
truth or falsity of the matter was the nation that "only Vorster
could! influence Rhodesian white . . . which was crucial to the con-
38
stitultional negotiations.1 No head way was made in the talks.
ShortfLy afterward Nkomo split with the FROLIZ.
Smith took advantage of the disagreements among nation
alist^ inside Rhodesia, and started separate talks with Nkomo
in Salisburg in December 1975. These talks also failed to produce
any t mgible results because Smith refused to accept immediate
majority rule which Nkomo demanded. At one point during the talks
Smith is said to have promised that "there would be no majority
39
rule in Rhodesia in a thousand years." In 1976 Nkomo discon
tinued the talks and headed off to Zambia to organise a guerilla
movement.
It was at this juncture that, fearing a repetition of
anothelr Angola-like situation in Zimbabwe, Dr. Henry Kissinger,
1976).
Africa Year Book and Who's Who in 1977, p. 39.
See The Guardian Extra-London (November 4, 1975), p.
See Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 7 (August
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the i:hen U.S. Secretary of State, jumped in with his subtle
shuttle diplomatic peace mission. He held separate talks with
Vorstter, Smith, Kaunda, Nyerere and the British government which
resulted in the Angola-American proposal which included the fol
lowing six points.
1. Majority rule within two years.
2. Ian Smith's regime to meet with African leaders
to organize an interim government to function
until majority rule was implemented.
3. A council of state, half black and half white was
to form the interim government.
4. United Kingdom was to enact legislation for the
process of the majority rule.
5. Lifting of economic sanction upon the establishment
of the interim government.
6. Economic aid to be made available to Rhodesia.
The five Front-Line Presidents quickly convened in Lusaka
on September 16, 1976 to study the Anglo-American peace proposal.
While not rejecting it outright, the Front Line Presidents said
that to accept it would be tantamount to legalising the colon
ialist and racist structure of power. Other African countries,
for instance, Nigeria and Ghana were so critical of the proposal
that tney even refused to meet with Dr. Henry Kissinger during
one of his shuttle tours to Africa.
The African fears of the Angola-American proposals were
confirmed when the so-called internal settlement was instituted.
See Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 9
(September 1-30, October 15, 1976), p. 4168.
41Ibid., p. 4171
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As Gkry Wassennan rightly contended, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rev.
Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau were only used to
enhar.ce the continuity of white rule in Rhodesia. Mr. P. K. Van
der Eyl, the white indiscreet Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs,
in May 1978, assured his white followers that their leaders had
achieved a master piece and that:
Nb one ever believed that we could get the internal
leaders to agree to so much ... whereas we were
alone, we now have the advantage of authentic black
nationalisim defending our political position.42
To return to the Anglo-Americna peace proposal, after
ing the six points, the Front-Line Presidents asked Britain
to convene at once a constitutional conference outside Zimbabwe.
This request was granted.
In order to present a united stand during the talks, Joshua
Nkomo of ZAPU and Robert Magabe of ZANU, on October 10, 1976,
agreed to the formation of a coalition called the Patriotic Front.
It was a loose alliance which presented a joint delegation dur
ing thi'. Geneva Peace talks. In January 1977, it was recognized
by the OAU on the sole legitimate nationalist movement in Zim
babwe . T
examir
As usual, the long talks broke down. The Patriotic
Front refused to go along with the deceitful proposal. On the
other hjmd, Rev. Muzorewa, Sithole and the other internal nation
alists igreed to accept the proposal. Nkomo and Mugabe with OAU
I ^Gary Wassennan, "The Economic Transition to Zimbabwe "
m Africa Report, vol. 23, no. 6 (November-December, 1978), p. 41.
A3
Ibid., pp. 44-45. See also Africa Diary, no. 38
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suppcrt boycotted the fake elections which were held in Rhodesia
in early part of 1978.
During the 1979 OAU Summit in Monrovia, the African leaders
reitelrated their recognition of the Patriotic Front as the sole
legitimate representative of the people of Zimbabwe, and further
resolved not to negotiate with the Muzorewa government. The Heads
of State and Government called upon each member state of the OAU
to tighten sanction and not to accord diplomatic recognition to
the Internal Settlement Government.
At the end of the Summit, the OAU leaders adopted a reso
lution by acclamation committing members to: "Apply effective cul
tural and political sanctions against any state which accords
recognition to the illegal racist minority regime in Zimbabwe."**
Great pressure was also exerted on Great Britain, especially by
the Coiimonwealth African States against Britain's recognition of
the Salisbury regime.
Meanwhile, the war was escalated. ZANU's 20,000*""* troops
based ijn Mozambique, and 5000 inside Zimbabwe, in Shana speaking
areas iti northern and eastern territories bordering Mozambique,
and ZAPU's 10,000 fighters in Zambia and 1000 in Zimbabwe, in
Ndebele speaking area bordering Zambia, declared full scale war.**'
All attempts by Bishop Muzorewa and Smith to win diplo
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American peace proposal which eventually led to the internal set
tlement refused to have any official dealing with Zimbabwe-
Rhodasia. Great pressure mounted by the Afro-Americans in the
Unitted States made the Carter Administration remain 'neutral' in
the continuous crisis in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If Mr. Dick Clark
the ::ormer Senior Senator from Iowa and Chairman of the African
Sub-Committee of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Andrew
Younj; the then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and the
Afro-American population did not protest and struggle hard,
especially during Smith and Muzorewa's visit to the U.S., the
Carter Administration would have probably gone along with Senator
Jesse Helms and his colleagues' demands of lifting sanctions
against Rhodesia.
While the Afro-Americans were putting political pressure
on ths U. S. government not to have any dealings with the In
ternal Settlement Government, the African Commonwealth members
did the same to Britain. On the eve of the Lusaka 1979 Common
wealth conference, President Nyerere belligerently declared in
Dar es Salaam that Tanzania would pull out of the Commonwealth
if Britain recognized the Muzorewa Government. Nigeria's take
over of British owned BP on the eve of the Lusaka Commonwealth
conference was another warning to Britain, Nyerere and Obasanjo
were indicating what would follow if Mrs. Margaret Thatcher's
Conservative Government rebuffed the African wishes concerning
Zimbabwe.
As it was expected, the Rhodesian crisis was the main
.pointl of discussion during the Commonwealth Conference in Zambia.
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The peace agreement was worked out by representatives from Ni
geria, Tanzania, Zambia, Britian, Australia and Jamaica. Let it
be noted that of the six countries that negotiated the peace,
three were the Front-Line states, and a fourth, Jamaica, being an
AfronCaribbean nation was sympathetic to the views of the other
Afridan representatives. It could, therefore, be safely con
cluded that the Lusaka agreement which laid the ground work for
the final real settlement of the Rhodesian crisis was the same
voice of the OAU.
Since the OAU empowered the Front-Line states to negotiate
with Any power for the purpose of establishing a genuine majority
rule, remembering also the full financial, political and moral
support the OAU gave to the Patriotic Front, it is my conclusion
that dhe Organization of African Unity played a positive role in




THE BALANCE SHEET OF THE ROLE OF THE OAU IN
SETTLING AFRICAN POLITICAL DISPUTES
In its numerous endeavours to settle the scores or prob-
facing the continent, the OAU did not fully utilize the
Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration which was
spec:.fically created as means of solving African problems. In
stead, individual heads of state and government or a number of
them
state
formed an ad hoc mediation or conciliation committees. This
process is often referred to as using good offices of a head of
dispute, the 'African framework approach' featured prominently.
This
or heads of states. In the course of trying to settle a
indigenous way of solving problems was aimed at excluding
foreign interference. That is to say, the problem was to be
settled by Africans themselves. Using the African framework
approach, the OAU achieved its first success when it success
fully ended hostilities between Morocco and Algeria during their
border crisis which erupted in 1963. The good officer of Em
peror Haile Selassie, President Modibo Keita of Mali and later





In the disputes between Ghana and its neighbours, espe-
y the one between Ghana and Upper Volta, the OAU played an
important role towards their settlement. Though it may be argued
that
Nk
the disputes were only finally settled in 1966 after Dr.
h had been overthrown, it could forcefully be contended
that I the OAU laid the ground work for their settlement. For
example, the Ghanian-Voltaic Commission which was set up at the
urging of the OAU negotiated the settlement of the dispute.
On another disputes concerning Dr. Nkrumah's subversion
activities, the OAU played an impressive role to curb them. Since
the 1965 Lagos Extraordinary Council of Ministers attack on Ghana,
Dr. Nkrumah promised not to let political refugees living in
Ghana cause more trouble.
Considering the Southern Sudan dispute; the good offices
of tht Emperor, with the collaboration of the World Council of
Churches, and the Sudanese authority, the seventeen years Anya-
Nya s cessionist rebellion was peacefully resolved in Addis Ababa
in 1972. In like manner, the 1971-72 Tanzania-Ugandan crisis was
settled through good offices of African leaders. The African
tradidion of respecting the wisdom of the elders and people of
distinction in helping to settle disputes was fully employed by
the OAU. Among the numerous examples that could be cited, a few
are outstanding. When Ghana detained a Guinean delegation on
its way to the OAU Council of Ministers conference in Addis Ababa
in 1966, it was the ad hoc committee comprising Emperor Haile





nzania and Nasser of Egypt that resolved the dispute. It
d also be remembered that it was the Emperor who in 1970
d to bring about a reconciliation between Nigeria and three
of tfye four African countries that recognized Biafra.
However, on the debit side neither the wisdom nor respect
for tjhe African elder statesmen could help resolve the Somalis-
Ethiapian-Kenyan border disputes, the Nigerian-Biafra crisis, and
the 1979 Tanzania invasion of Uganda. Another major failure of
the OAU has been its inability to liberate Namibia and South
Afric|a in spite of the countless resolution passed.
But it should not be taken to mean that the OAU did not
do itfe best in trying to solve these 'hard' problems. Regarding
the long standing Somali problem in the Horn, Cervenka best
acknowledged OAU efforts by saying:
The success of O.A.U. intervention in the disputes
between Somalia and Kenya was achieved in an extra-
oidinary session at Dar es Salaam in 1964. When the
dispute came up again at the 1973 O.A.U. Summit in
Addis Ababa, five heads of state ... persuaded Presi
dent Barre of Somali to co-operate with the Committee
in a search for a compromise.2
It must be reiterated that great power intervention during the
1978 Ethiopia-Somali war in Ogaden, during the 1967-1970 Nigeria-
Biafra War, and the present war over the former Spanish or
Western Sahara ruled out any chance of peaceful settlement on the
basis of the African framework.
Zambia, Ivory Coast and Tanzania. Reconciliation
betweer^ Nigeria and Gabon came much later.
2
It was made up of Nigeria, Senegal, Liberia, Guinea and
Mali.
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Yet, even in the three last examples indicated above, the
OAU did all it could to bring peace. Without doubt, the Nigerian
Civil War received much attention from the OAU, which was un-
shakible in its desire that the crisis be settled following its
guidelines, that is, that Biafra should renounce secession in
order! to keep Nigeria united. Over the Polisario problem in the
3
Maghded, the OAU's ad hoc commission of wise men is still working
on ending the disptue. There has been significant progress. The
OAU resolution on self-determination of the Sahrawi people has
been Lchoed by the U.N., Spain, France and Mauritania. Concerning
the liberation of Southern Africa, and Rhodesia in particular,
without the support of the Front Line States (which has backing
of tho OAU) and financial, moral, and material support contributed
by thi OAU member states to intensify the guerilla warfare, Mr.
Ian Silith would not have moderated his hard line in Rhodesia.
With the above considerations in mind, let me conclude
that tihe only major conflicts which the OAU was unable to solve
or do anything positive to stop were the Ethiopian-Somali War,
the invasion of Uganda by Tanzania, and the Nigerian-Biafra War.
The Need For An All-African High Command
As I indicated earlier, foreign intervention makes it
extremely difficult for the OAU to settle problems that involve
armed Confrontations. The present day world wide crises are not
solved by wise diplomats. The United States and the Soviet Union
p. 66.
3Zdenek Cervenka, Unfinished Quest for African Unity,
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sit side by side to discuss SALT agreement only after each coun
try cias counted the number and quality of destructive weapons it
has. I am suggesting that most of the present day violent
political problems are solved by the use of force. Therefore,
the only way that the OAU can play a more dynamic role is through
the formation of an All-African Army which could be used in a
manner similar to that of the U.N. forces. The idea of establish
ing an African High Command had been around even before the crea
tion Df the OAU. The Casablanca group spelled out the creation
of an African army in its charter.
During the establishment of the OAU in May 1963, the
African leaders gave deference to the idea of an All-African army.
They :.ncluded a Defense Commission in the OAU Charter.
Inspite of everything this commission has not been used.
It was only during the 1978 OAU Summit in Khartoum that it was
activated to study the establishment of the Pan-African force.
It wa: proposed that the Pan African Force, if established, would
come u|nder direct supervision and command of the OAU.' Speaking
in favjour of such an All-African Army, General Obasanjo, head of
the Nigerian Military Government, stressed that:
. as the UN can act if world peace is threatened,
in
should the O.A.U. be empowered to effectively act
the event of a situation which threatens African
See Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, p. 232. See also
Nkrumalji, Africa Must Unite, pp. 141-149.
See O.A.U. Charter Article XX paragraph four.
6See New Africa (July 1979), no. 143, pp. 18-19.







view was supported by President Tolbert in his opening ad
dress during the 1979 OAU Summit in Monrovia, when he called
the creation of a machinery to "enable the O.A.U. to respond
tly at all times to problems which threaten the peace and
security of the continent.
If this long overdue All African Army is created, it
woulld serve four useful purposes. First of all, such an army
will support member states in the event of aggression from forces
outlLlde the continent or directed by foreigners. France has now
becoL the self appointed African policemen, claiming the right
and responsibility to intervene in Africa at its discretion.1
all impunity, in February 1964, French troops landed inWith
Libreville, Gabon, to reinstate Leon Mba who had been ousted in
a coLp. Since 1968 French troops have virtually dictated policy
in cfciad; in April 1977 and May 1978 French soldiers were flown
into Zaire to help President Mobutu to repel the rebels invading
ShabL province; France has also intervened in Mauritania and
Senegal, and lately, it planned and executed a coup that over-
threl Emperor Bokassa, and installed government of its choice.
FreJch mercenaries, headed by the notorious Bob Denard, have
causLd untold havoc ranging from the toppling of the government









Nigerian Civil War. France also maintains well over
12,COO stationed almost permanently on African soil. Apart
froir France, the Portuguese, Cubans, Israelis, Belgians, West
Germans, and other Western countries have used their military
power to humiliate African states. Had there been an African
security Army, some of these insults would not have gone un-
chalLenged.
Secondly, an All-African Army would be used to assist in
the African liberation struggle. Instead of leaving all the
figh ing to the nationalists in various countries, an African
High Command would speed up, for instance, the liberation of
Namibia and South Africa.
Angola and Mozambique provide eloquent examples of states
where an African Army could consolidate African revolution. The
forces of imperialsim and neo-colonialism are undermining not
only the independence of Mozambique and in particular Angola, but
the effectiveness of the OAU as well. The situation in Angola
deserves further critical comments.
The OAU had recognised Popular Movement for the libera
tion t>f Angola (MPLA) of Dr. Agostino Neto which finally liberated
Angolk. Angola became a sovereign independent state in 197'6, but
some Western countries with the collaboration of Zaire and South
Africa are still aiding the National Union for the total indepen
dence
1978),
of Angola (UNITA) of Dr. Jonas Savimbi. Why is UNITA still
11
p. 26.
See Africa Report, vol. 23, no. 6 (November-December
12
New Africa, no. 131 (July 1978), p. 27.
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fignting when independence has been won" Mr. Arnoud de Borch-
grave, a U.S. journalist who was sent to accompany Savimbi dur
ing
Dr
one of his visits to the U.S. tells us that:
Invited by Freedom House ... . Savimbi (is) expected to
meet this week with President Carter's National Security
Adviser, Zbegniew Brzezinski. Visits also were planned
with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Republican
Presidential hopefuls John Connally and /lexander Haig have
asked to meet with him. A press conference was scheduled
for Washington, and Savimbi hoped to drum up support for
his war against the Marxist government of Angola and its
Cuban allies . ..."
Savimbi's warm reception by the U.S. government officials and
influential U.S. opinion makers in November 1979 was not the
only worry of the Angolan leaders. The main concern is the dis
closure that "a consortium of nations contributed $30 million to
UN(ITA liberation efforts." These contributions were obviously
jjde by the United States, South Africa, France and West Germany
wtfich are interested in Angola's wealth. The main question to
answered is why foreign nations decide to subvert an indepen
dent African state without the OAU doing something. Mr. George
Hibusen, the director of the American Committee on Africa, was
right when he remarked that President Carter's plans were
13
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave is a Newsweek journalist who
as sent from the U.S.A. to Angola to accompany Dr. Jonas Savimbi
o the United States. The official story is narrated in Newsweek,
ovember 12, 1979, p. 12.
14
15




This is a church sponsored lobby group in Washington?
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"tantamount to a declaration of war on the Angolan Government."
I have commented at length on the foreign sabotage of
Angblan independence solely for the purpose of stressing that it
would need a combined force of all African states, in the form
of k Pan-African High command to save Angola from imperialist
machinations.
The thitd urgent need for an African Army is to provide a
peale-keeping force in the event of conflict between African
stales or in case of a civil war, and the fourth necessity for
the creation of such a force is to cooperate with the United
Nations on matters of defense and security affecting African
statjes.
Foreign intervention is rampant in Africa on the pretext
of preserving stability, and law and order. However, in most
caseb, as it was shown during the treatment of the Algeria-
Morotco border crisis, the Nigerian-Biafra War, and the crisis
in the Horn of Africa, foreign intervention only serves the eco-
nomik, military, and political interests of the imperialist
poweJrs. This Ecomilpoli18 complex can be understood more clearly
by examining the 1978 foreign intervention in Zaire. The Western
spokesman was none other than the former NATO Supreme Commander,
General Alexander Haig, who, speaking about the military
17New Africa, no.'131 (July 1978), p. 28.
l^This is a term I have concocted from a combination of
the flirst three letters of economic, military and the first four
letters of political. This order of arrangement of the letters
is based in consideration that economic motives were the most
important (followed) by military back up the economic interest)
and politics,mainly propoganda, is a means of achieving the first
two.
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intervention in Shaba province, declared that it was "the first
concerted Western military response to the Soviet-Cuban presence
19
in Africa.1 Of course, the socialist countries retorted by
decrying that the imperialist Shaba intervention was a calculated
20
'NAfTO operation hatched in Brussels."


















lar, at best are indifferent to the idea of an All-African
, and at worst, try hard to sabotage the idea by introducing
ions suitable to them. Once again, France provides a good
ructionist example. France is said to have the interests of
ca's stability in mind, and on this basis intervenes to save
ous countries. During the Shaba conflict, she decided that
lar problems should be handled by Africans themselves through
n-African army. A Franco-African summit conference was called
ersailles, and was attended by twenty-one countries, including
e, Maurituis, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Pricipe
21
h are non-Francophone African states. Benin and Niger were
opposing voices; Presidents Leopold Sengher, Houphoet-Biogny,
ema and Emperor Bokassa strongly supported the France backed
African force. This was not surprising because France has
s stationed almost permanently in the countries supporting
19New Africa, no. 131 (July 1978), p. 27.
20Ibid.
21
This Summit took place on May 21-22. Cameroon and
gasy refused to attend. See Africa Research Bulletin.





the idea. The United States also welcomed the idea, for in
1978, during a meeting between President Carter and Giscard
d'Estaing, the two leaders agreed to jointly aid efforts to form
a Pan-African military force.
The force was to be made up of African troops, but with
logistical support of Europe and the United States. What an
insult. Was this not the same arrangement as was the case during
the First and Second World Wars when the colonial soldiers fought
and died under foreign European commanders? If the West is in
terested in the establishment of such an army, let it only give
the weapons and money and let the Africans manage the whole opera
tion! themselves.
The reasons why the big powers are not enthusiastic about
creation of an All-African High Command, completely under the
OAU jmbrella are obvious. United African force would be a threat
and challenge to the imperialist interventions. Above all, such
an a:rmy would oppose foreign acquisition of military bases in the
continent. This would mean blocking NATO's aims in the strate
gically important continent. Finally, such an army will be a
threat to the imperialsit economic grip in Southern Africa.
What Roger Gaudefroy-Demombynes, a French official in
colorial Morocco, said long ago is still valid today. He de




For example, France has 1,300 troops in Senegal, 4000









So, to preserve real African independence and prevent
divide and rule through foreign military intervention, there
n urgent necessity for the creation of an All-African High
Conrndand.
The establishment of a genuine Pan-African force is not
the lonly remedy needed to make the OAU more responsive to the
continent's mounting political disputes. The OAU charter itself
needs a revision. Africa is changing very rapidly. Conditions
of sixteen years ago are not the same ones prevailing now. The
present charter retains the actions of its Secretary General.
Theoretically, his functions are mainly administrative. He should
be given a much broader role and more extensive power, for he is
the man at the scene of most problems, discussions and most OAU
conferences. Unlike the OAU chairman who only holds office for
one year, the Secretary General is often around for many years.
He systematically follows the development of issues. If the pro
posals now under consideration are accepted, the OAU Secretary-
General will have a key role to play. It is suggested that he
be assisted by a military adviser who will in turn be assisted
25
by high ranking military officers.
The Establishment of the So-called Human Rights Charter
tor Africa Under the Auspices of the OAU
Of recent, there have been loud cries for including a
declaration on 'Human Rights' into the OAU charter. Such
24
Ray Schaap, Meter and Wolf, ed. Dirty Work 2, The CIA
in Afrjica (Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1979), p. 16T.
25
New Africa, No. 143 (July 1979), p. 19.
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advocates point to the reign of terror during the rules of Field
Marshall Idi Amin of Uganda, President Macias Nguema of Equa-
26
tor Lai Guinea, and Emperor Bekassa of Central Africa Empire, to
le
but three notorious rulers who tortured, imprisoned and
kil d at will, and maintain that it is about time the OAU started
talking about 'peoples' rights and not so mu~h about states rights.
point to the United Nation Organization Charter and argue
that: the OAU charter should also affirm human rights. This issue
deserves a brief examination. Acccording to Inis Claude,
. . . the emphasis in the Charter £u.N.7 upon the promo
tion of respect for human rights lends color to the sug
gestion that the United Nations was built upon a concep
tion hastily generalized from immediately preceding ex
perience. The view that the danger of war emanates from
totalitarian governments, that war is caused by the dia
bolical plots of ruthless dictators who are contemptuous
to human rights.^'
Now let us apply this background to the place of human
rights in African political problems. If it is assumed that




good to Emperor Bokassa, Presdients Nguema, and Amin? Were
the devils behind the grave political problems facing
Africa. Let us accept the contention that dictator Amin's
violation of human rights led Ugandans to flee to Tanzania where
organized and launched an attack, and in trying to repel it
Amin got in trouble with Nyerere. However, it seems to me that
the main question to ask is, who was the brain behind, or who
26Ibid.
27
Inis Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, pp. 70-71.
147
encouraged such cruelties done by most African leaders? Certainly,
the
me
same big powers: France, Britain and the United States. Let
explain by giving concrete examples.
It is an open secret that the Public Safety Unit, the
State Research Center and other bodies through which Amin carried
on Ithe torture and murders had their officer, trained in Britian
and the United States. The devices through which the tortures
and murders were carried on were not manufactured in Africa. To
be more specific, ten of Amin's henchmen working at the Public
Safety Unit received their training at the International Police
Academy in Washington, D. C., and three at the International
Police Servcies, Inc., where they received instructions on tor-
turj.28
Britain supplied various security equipment to Amin's
Statie Research Center. These ranged from telephone-tapping equip
ment , right-vision devices, burglar alarms, anti-bomb blankets
and many more. The U.S. supplied Amin with planes and American
29
pilots to fly them.
It was France that helped Bokassa to take power in 1966
and Without the support from Paris, he would not have remained
thers so long. But when he fell out with France, he was over
thrown by the same forces that installed him to power. The
presence of French troops in nearly all the major Africa-Franco-
Ray Schaap Meter and Wolf, ed., Dirty Work 2, The CIA





ne states is to support their rulers whose regimes, with few
eptions are very repressive.
The point I have laboured to make clear is that human
riglhts issue, though serious in Africa, would not arise if the
imi erialists did not make the ground fertile for it. The guilty
African leaers are merely dancing the tune puped by the forces
outside Africa. The underground prisons, unbearable concentra






filled with political prisoners. Since it is not unusual to
havu the ex-colonial powers' teams of advisers assigned to their
olonies present rulers, the great powers still have enormous
uence in African politics. The root cause of the human rights
es lies within the big powers who are influencing the various
es. The emphasis then should be on the eradication of im-









The OAU is only sixteen years old. It is far too early
dge it harshly. Political problems are not mathematical
with quick and sure solutions. It took the Latin American
ries scores of years to complete their revolutions. Some
ean problems were settled only after hundred years of fight-
The problem in Northern Ireland is not yet resolved. Even
reatest power in the world, the United States, took nearly
hundred years to sign the last peace treaty with the
Indisns. But in only sixteen years, compared to the Arab League












Professor George Liska's view that small or weak regional
nizations are incapable of deterring aggression and therefore
preserve regional peace and security, and that big powers
uence will always be present, is not totally accurate as far
research has shown. While big powers influence has been
t, OAU member states, either through establishments like the
t-Line states, ad hoc committees or good offices have done
to preserve peace in Africa. Leaders from such radical
es like Tanzania, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, to name a few have
for big power influences.room
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APPENDIX A
CHARTER OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
Addis Ababa, May 1963
We, tine Heads of States and Governments assembled in the City
of Adjdis Ababa, Ethiopia;
Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to
control their own destiny;
:onscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and
dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples;
ionscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and
human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our
peoples in spheres of human endeavour;
Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding
among bur peoples and co-operation among our States in response
to thejaspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity,
in a lkrger unity transcending ethnic and national differences;
Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into
a dynamic force in the cause of human-progress, conditions for
peace and security must be established and maintained;
Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won indepen
dence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our
States, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms;
Dedicated to the general progress of Africa;
Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Uni
versal .Declaration of Human Rights, to the principles of which we
reaffini our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful
and positive co-operation among States;
Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so
that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured;
Resblved to reinforce the links between our States by estab
lishing and strengthening common institutions;















tA\ «du?"lonal and cultural co-operation-





neigfbouring States or any other S?ateT
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6, absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African
territories which are still dependent;




Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to
become a Member of the Organisation.
Rig tits and Duties of Member States
Article V
All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.
ArtLcle VI
The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the










Organisation shall accomplish its purposes through the fol-
.ng principal institutions:
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government;
the Council of Ministers;
the General Secretariat;
the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
Assembly of Heads of State and Government
Arti.cle VIII
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the
supreme organ of the Organisation. It shall, subject to the
provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern
to Africa with a view to co-ordinating and harmonising the gen
eral policy of the Organisation. It may in addition review
theTstructure, functions and acts of all the organs and any
specialised agencies which may be created in accordance with
the present Charter,
Article IX
The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Govern
ment or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet
at least once a year. At the request of any Member State and
approved by the majority of the Member States, the Assembly shall










































Each Member State shall have one vote.
mberfir^forganisatioT
Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority
her or not a question is one of procedure shall be deter-
:d by a simple majority of all Member States of the Organisa-
Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organisation shall
i a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly
cle XI
tO determine own rules of
Council of Ministers
cle XII
i.°? Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers
er S?ates. " " '" desiSnated b? the Governments of
The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a vear
requested by any Member State and approved bytwo-^hirdl'of
Member States it shall meet in extraordinary Lslion
cle XIII
Mjnisters sha11 be responsible to the Assembly
? an GoTernment- ^ shall be entrusted with the
? lllii I I PreParinS conferences of the Assembly,
t shall take cognisance of any matter referred to it by the
?i?; nl i-S a be entrusted with the implementation of the
ons of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government It
co-ordinate inter-African co-operation in accordance'
rr^iTiiL^Ltii^and in fi^
le XIV
ach Member State shall have one vote
11 resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority
e members of the Council of Ministers J y'
£hi2;d?iOS the tOtal membership of the Council of
shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council
ArtieLe XV




There shall be an Administrative Secretary-General of the Organi
sation, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government. The Administrative Secretary-General shall





e shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the








functions and conditions of services of the Secretary-
General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees
of the Secretariat shall be governed by the provisions of this
bl f dter and the regulations approved by the Assem y o Hea s
tate and Government.
In the performance of their duties the Administrative Secre
tary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruction
from any government or from any other authority external to the
Organisation. They shall refrain from any action which might
reflect on their position as international officials responsible
onlyl to the Organisation.
2. Sach member of the Organisation undertakes to respect the
exclasive character of the responsibilities of the Administrative
Secretary-General and the Staff and not to seek to influence them
in tie discharge of their responsibilities.
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration
Article XIX
Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by
peaceful means and, to this end, decide to establish a Commis-
sionlof Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition
of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate
Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an inte
gral part of the present Charter.
Specialised Commissions
Article XX
The Assembly shall establish such Specialised Commissions as it
may deem necessary including the following:
1. Economic and Social Commission;
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2. Educational and Cultural Commission;
3. Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission;
4. Defence Commissipn;
5. Scientific, Technical and Research Commission.
Article XXI
Each Specialised Commission referred to in Article XX shall be
composed of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Pleni
potentiaries designated by the Government of the Member States.
Article XXII
The functions of the Specialised Commissions shall be carried out
in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of





The budget of the Organisation prepared by the Administrative
Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers.
mn-- budget shall be provided by contributions from Member States






ided, however, that no Member State shall be assessed an
amount exceeding twenty percent of the yearly regular budget of
Organisation. The Member States agree to pay their respec-
contributions regularly.
Signature and Ratification of Charter
Article XXIV
1. This Charter shall be open for signature of all independent
sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory
Status in accordance with their respective constitutional pro
cesses.
2. The original instrument, done if possible in African lan
guages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic,
shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall
transmit certified copies there of to all independent sovereign
African States.
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the






This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by
the Government of Ethiopia of the instrument of ratification
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frojn two-thirds of the signatory States.
Registration of the Charter
Article XXVI
Thiu Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with
the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of
Eth:.opia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the
Unii:ed Nations.
Int irpretation of the Charter
Article XXVII
Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of
thid Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation.
Adhesion and Accession
Article XXVIII
1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time
notiffy the Administrative Secretary-General of its intention
to ddhere or accede to this Charter.
2. [The Administrative Secretary-General shall, on receipt of







sion shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member
as. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted
^Administrative Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt




The working languages of the Organisations and all its institu
tions shall be, if possible, African languages, English and
French.
Artiile XXX
The Administrative Secretary-General may accept on behalf of the
Organisation figts, bequests and other donations made to the





The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and
immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat
:he respective territories of the Member States.
Cessation of Membership
Article XXXII
Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward
a written notification to the Administrative Secretary-General.
At t:he end of one year from the date of such notification, if
not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to
the renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the
Organisation.










Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes
request to the Administrative Secretary-General to
effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is
submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the
er States have been duly notified of it and a period of one
has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective





In Faith Whereof, We, the Heads of African States and






































The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration estab
lished by Article XIX of the Charter of the Organisation of
African Unity shall be governed by the provisions of the present
Prot >col.
Artible II
1. The Commission shall consist of twenty-one members elected by
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
2. No two members shall be nationals of the same State.
3. The Members of the Commission shall be persons with recog
nised professional qualifications.
4. Each Member State of the Organsiation of African Unity shall
be entitled to nominate two candidates.
5. The Administrative Secretary-General shall prepare a list
of the candidates nominated by Member States and shall submit
it to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Article III
1. ft embers of the Commission shall be elected for a term of five
years and shall be eligible for re-election.
2. Members of the Commission whose terms of office have expired
shall remain in office until the election of a new Commission.
3. Notwithstanding the expiry of their terms of office, members







s of the Commission shall not be removed from office except
ision of the assembly of Heads of State and Government,
•:wo-thirds majority of the total membership, on the grounds




1. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the Commission, it shall be
ed in conformity with the provisions of Article II
I'A m^ber.of the Commission elected to fill a vacancy shall






A President and two Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the
mbly of Heads of State and Government from among the members




The President and the two Vice-Presidents shall be full-time
Article VII
Bureau
-t, n the.two Vice-Presidents shall constitute the
the Commission and shall have the responsibility of
-, Wi5- the Parties as regards the appropriate mode of
the dispute in accordance with this protocol.
Article VIII
SS. "i"J!! ofth^'otw^P^ the Tmiers of the Bureau and theor the other members of the Commission shall be







Sha11 aPP°int a Registrar and may provide for
as may be deemed ne
o^^Tf??i°n
other officers cessary
The terms and conditions of service of the
Article X
Administrative expenses of the Commission shall be borne byThe
the lOrgansiation of'Xf^can U^ityT 7ll"th« ^xpens^ incS?reJ
in connection with the proceedings before the Collision 35l
be net in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Commission.
Article XI





The Commission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between
Stares only.
Artilcle XIII
1. A dispute may be referred to the Commission jointly by the
parties concerned, by a party to the dispute, by the Council of
Ministers or by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
2. Where a dispute has been referred to the Commission as
provided in paragraph I, and one or more of the parties have
reftised to submit to the jurisdiction of the. Commission, the
Bureau shall refer the matter to the Council of Ministers for
consideration.
Article XIV
The consent of any party to a dispute to submit to the jurisdic
tion of the Commission may be evidenced by:
(a) a prior written undertaking by such party that there shall
be recourse to Mediation, Conciliation or Arbitration;
(b) reference of a dispute by such party to the Commission; or
(c) submission by such party to the jurisdiction in respect of
a dispute referred to the Commission by another State, by the
Courcil of Ministers, or by the Assembly of Heads of State and
Govc rnment.
Article XV
Member States shall refrain from any act or commission that is
likely to aggravate a situation which has been referred to the
Goran iss ion.
Article XVI
Subject to the Provisions of this protocol and any special
agreement between the parties, the Commission shall be entitled
to adopt such working methods as it deems to be necessary and
expedient'and shall establish appropriate rules of procedure.
Article XVII
The nembers of the Commission, when engaged in the business of
the Commission, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities
as provided for in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities
of tie Organisation of African Unity.
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Artible XVIII







,h°iiIZCmcilifltion ProPosed by the mediator are










°? the Petition> the President shall, in agree-
parties, establish a Board of Conciliators, of whom
aPP°ln5ed by thf Presiden^ from among the members
, and one each by the parties
?^irrnan of the Board shall be a person designated by the
t from among the three members of the Commission
J. in nominating persons to serve as members of the Board the
parties to the dispute shall designate persons in such a way that
no iwo members of it shall be nationals of the same State
Article XXIV
1. It shall be the duty of the Board of Conciliators to clarify
the issues m dispute and to endeavour to bring about an agree-
mem. between the parties upon mutually acceptable terms
i. The Board shall consider all questions submitted to it and
may undertake any inquiry or hear any person capable of giving
relevant information concerning the dispute. givxng
3. In the absence of agreement to the contrary between the







parties shall be represented by agents, whose duty shall be
.ct as intermediaries between them and the Board. They may
:over be assisted by counsel and experts and may request-that






.rt stItiigSei?her^ proceedinSs' the Board shall draw up a
that the parties have come to an agreement and, if the
need arises the terms of the agreement and any recom-
I mendations for settlement made by the Board- or
,b) that it has been impossible to effect a settlement.
I'n -Kbe rep?rt of the Board of Conciliators shall be communicated
to .he parties and to the President of the Commission without








J116?6^1^18 fSreed that arbitration should be resorted to the
tral Tribunal shall be established in the following manner:
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(a) each party shall designate one arbitrator from among
the members of the Commission having legal qualifications;
(b) the two arbitrators thus designated shall, by common
agreement, designate from among the members of the Commission
a third person who shall act as Chairman of the Tribunal.
(c) where the two arbitrators fail to agree on the choice of
the person to be Chairman of the Tribunal the Bureau shall
designate the Chairman.
2. The President may, with the agreement of the parties, appoint
to the Arbitral Tribunal two additional members who need not be
members of the Commission but who shall have the same powers as
the other members of the Tribunal.
3. The arbitrators shall not be nationals of the parties nor may
they have their domicile in the territories of the parties or be
employed in their service. They shall all be of different
nationals.
Article XXVIII
urse to arbitration shall be regarded as submission in good














1. The parties shall, in each case, conclude a compromise which
shall specify:
(a) the undertaking of the parties to go to arbitration, and
to accept as legally binding, the decision of the Tribunal,
(b) the subject matter of the controversy, and
(c) the Seat of the Tribunal.
2. The compromise may specify the law to be applied to the
Tribunal and the power, if the parties so agree, to adjudicate
ex asquo et bono, the time limit within which the award shall be
rendered, and the appointment of agents and counsel to take part
in tie proceedings before the Tribunal.
cle XXX
tie absence of any provision in the compromise regarding the
Lcable law, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute
rding to treaties concluded between the parties. Inter
nal Law, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity,
Charter of the United Nations and if the parties agree,
»quo et bono.
:le XXXI
learings shall be held in camera unless the arbitrators
le otherwise.
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2. The record of the proceedings signed by the arbitrators and
the Registrar shall alone be authoritative.
3. The arbitral award shall be in writing and shall, in respect





The present Protocol shall, upon approval by the Assembly of
of State and Government, be an integral part of the Charter
of the Organisation of African Unity.
Article XXXIII
This Protocol may be amended or revised in accordance with the
provisions of Article XXXIII of the Charter of the Organisation
of African Unity.
ment
In Faith Whereof, We, the Heads of African State and Govern-



























National Liberation Front (Algeria)
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe
Kenya African National Union
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Northern Frontier District (Kenya)
Organization of American States
Organization of African Unity
Afro-Malagas Common Organization
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqueit
el Hamra and Rio de Oro
Southern Sudanese Liberation Force
Unilateral Declaration of Independence
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
Zimbabwe African National Union
Zimbabwe African People's Union
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